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THAT MUST SURELY COME TO MIND IS: Why
section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial
on
another article
Code ?' The adoption of article 2 of the Code by 49 States, 2 the District
of Columbia and the Virgin Islands has been accompanied by a
virtual avalanche of articles,3 notes 4 and comments s discussing and
dissecting this section. In all likelihood, this scholarly attention has
HE FIRST QUESTION

Univ. of Pittsburgh; J.D. Univ. of Pennsylvania; Member, Pennsylvania Bar; Assistant Professor of Business Law, Wharton School, Univ. of Pennsylvania.
* A.B. Marshall Univ.; J.D. LL.M., New York Univ.; Member, West Virginia Bar;
Associate Professor of Business Law, Wharton School, Univ. of Pennsylvania.
'UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1962 Official Text, as amended in 1966 and 1972) (hereinafter cited as CODE].
2 Article 2 of the Code has not been adopted in Louisiana.
*A.B.

3

See, e.g., Curman, The Law of Sales under the Uniform Commercial Code, 17 RUTGERS
L. REV. 14 (1962); Davenport, How to Handle Sales of Goods: The Problem of Conflicting Purchase Orders and Acceptances and New Concepts in Contract Law, 19 Bus.
LAW. 75 (1963); Hawkland, Major Changes under the Uniform Commercial Code in the
Formation and Terms of Sales Contracts, 10 PRAc. LAw. 73 (1964); Kove, 'The Battle
of the Forms": A Proposalto Revise Section 2-207, 3 U.C.C.L.J. 7 (1970); Lipman, On
Winning the Battle of the Forms: An Analysis of Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 24 Bus. LAW. 789 (1969); Murray, Intention over Terms: An Exploration of
UCC 2-207 and New Section 60, Restatement of Contracts, 37 FORD. L. REV. 317 (1969);
Pucki, The Battle of the Forms - Section 2-207 under the U.C.C., 7 AM. Bus. L.J. 19
(1969); Resnick, Conflicting Boiler Plate-Effect of the Uniform Commercial Code, 18 Bus.
LAW. 401 (1963); Weeks, "Battle of the Forms" under the Uniform Commercial Code,
52 ILL. B.J. 660 (1964). The compilation in this and the following footnotes is not all
inclusive. Only materials directly relevant to the subject matter scope of this article are
referenced.
4
See, e.g., Note, Contracts: Sale of Goods: Acceptance of Offer: Additional or Different
Terms., Section 2-207 Uniform Commercial Code: Section 84-a, New York Personal
Property Law (New), 46 CORNELL L.Q. 308 (1961); Note, Uniform Commercial Code:
Variation Between Offer and Acceptance under Section 2-207, 1962 DUKE L.J. 613; Note,
In Defense of the Battle of Forms: Curing the "First Shot" Flaw in Section 2-207 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 49 NOTRE DAME LAw. 384 (1973); Note, Contract Draftsmanship under Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 564
(1964); Note, All Quiet on the 2-207 Front?, 35 U. PITT. L. REV. 685 (1974).
$See, e.g., Comment, A Look at a Strict Construction of Section 2-207 of the Uniform
Commercial Code from the Seller's Point of View or What's So Bad About Roto-Lith?,
An Interpretation of the
8 AKRON L. REv. 111 (1974); Comment, Contracts Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-207(1), 51 KY. L.J. 563 (1963); Comment,
(Continued on next page)
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focused on section 2-207 because it represents one of the more radical
departures from the common law traditions that existed in most
jurisdictions at the time article 2 of the Code was adopted.
6
In the roughly two decades since the Code's initial adoption,
an ever-increasing number of cases applying and interpreting the
section have appeared.' Given the kaleidoscopic range of commercial
transactions in which section 2-207 may find application, many of
these cases have focused on relatively narrow contexts and issues.
In turn, much of the academic and professional commentary has been
mere reaction to the narrow issues raised by the courts. A broader,
more comprehensive approach, consolidating all of the literature and
court decisions for reflection and possible resolution of the basic
issues involved in the application of section 2-207 now seems appropriate. In the process of this review, the authors have endeavored
not only to present the existing trends in interpretation and application of the section, but to suggest preferred resolutions. The analysis
of these resolutions culminates in a decision model proposed for use
in every court decision under section 2-207. Finally, a statutory re-

(Continued from preceding page)
Section 2-207 and the "Counter Offer": Acceptance Unlimted?, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 477
(1962); Comment, Nonconforming Acceptances under Section 2-207 of the Uniform
Commercial Code: An End to the Battle of the Forms, 30 U. CHI. L. REV., 540 (1963);
Comment, The Uniform Commercial Code and Contract Law: Some Selected Problems,
105 U. PA. L. REv. 836 (1957); Comment, Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial
Code - New Rules for the "Battle of the Forms," 32 U. PiTr. L. REV. 209 (1971); 42
B.U.L. REV. 373 (1962); 76 HARV. L. REV. 1481 (1963); 111 U. PA. L. REV. 132
(1962).
'The Code was first adopted in Pennsylvania in 1954. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-207
(1970).
'Medical Dev. Corp. v. Industrial Molding Corp., 479 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1973); Dorton
v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161 (6th Cir. 1972); Southeastern Enamelling
Corp. v. General Bronze Corp., 434 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1970); Construction Aggregates
Corp. v. Hewitt-Robins, Inc., 404 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1968); Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P.
Bartlett & Co., Inc., 297 F.2d 497 (1st. Cir. 1962); Baumgold Bros., Inc. v. Allan M.
Fox Co., East, 375 F. Supp. 807 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Rite Fabrics, Inc. v. Stafford-Higgins
Co., Inc. 366 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Oskey Gasoline and Oil Co., Inc. v. OKC
Refining Inc., 364 F. Supp. 1137 (D. Minn. 1973); Bickett v. W. R. Grace & Co., 12
UCC REP. SERV. 629 (W.D. Ky. 1972); Joseph Muller Corp. Zurich v. Commonwealth
Petrochemicals, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); 'Jones & McKnight Corp. v.
Birdsboro Corp., 320 F. Supp. 39 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Windsor Mills, Inc. v. Collins &
Aikman Corp., 25 Cal. App. 3d 987, 101 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1972); American Parts Co.
v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 8 Mich. App. 156, 154 N.W.2d 5 (1967); Application
of Doughboy Indus., Inc., 17 App. Div. 2d 216, 233 N.Y. Supp. 2d 488 (1962) (preCode case); In re Tunis Mfg. Corp., 11 UCC REP. SERV. 544 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972);
Bauer Int'l Corp. v. Eastern Twp. Produce Ltd., 4 UCC REP. SERV. 735 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1967); In re Barclay Knitwear Co., Inc., 8 UCC REP. SERV. 44 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970);
.J. A. Maurer, Inc. v. Singer Co., 7 UCC REP. SERV. 110 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970); Silverstyle Dress Co. v. Aero-Knit Mills, Inc., 11 UCC REP. SERV. 292 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972);
Tidewater Lumber Co., Inc. v. Maryland Lumber Co., 3 UCC REP. SERV. 351, (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1966); Trafalgar Square, Ltd. v. Reeves Bros. Inc., 7 UCC REP. SERV. 712 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1970); Frances Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Burlington Indus., Inc. 19 N.C. App. 678, 200
S.E.2d 668 (1973); Ohio Grain Co. v. Swisshelm, 15 UCC REP. SERV. 305 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1973); Just Born, Inc. v. Stein, Hall & Co., Inc., 59 Pa. D. & C.2d 407 (1971);
McAfee v. Brewer, 214 Va. 579, 203 S.E.2d 129 (1974); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v.
Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 193, 206 N.W.2d 414 (1973).
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vision is advanced as a viable alternative for insuring proper, consistent and, most importantly, fair resolutions of situations which section
2-207 was intended to cover.
To facilitate achievement of the above goals, this article is divided
into six parts: (1) a description of the modern commercial context
within which section 2-207 was created and is now applied; (2) a
summary of the pre-Code rule; (3) an overview of the rule engendered by section 2-207; (4) an analysis of the interpretative history
of section 2-207; (5) a proposed decision model for the application
of section 2-207; and (6) the suggested statutory revision.
Commercial Context
It is impossible to understand the problems that existed under the
pre-Code common law rule and the reason why section 2-207 took
the form it did, without at least a general understanding of the commercial setting in which first the common law rule and then section
2-207 operated. Historically, as the purchase and sale of goods in
the commercial setting became more complex, the results obtained
under the common law acceptance rules came under increasing scrutiny. Individualized negotiation where the parties arranged in advance all of the terms of a transaction and memorialized them in a
carefully drafted, unique document, became limited to special, important transactions. The everyday requirements had become speed,
volume and the lowest possible transactional cost. The solution to
these needs lay in the use of form documents administered by relatively low-level employees. This, in turn, resulted in documents which
contained terms applicable to a whole range of situations which were
often sent without careful regard for the particular point in the
negotiations reached by the parties to the transaction." The following
transactional characteristics represent an amalgam of those found in
the litigated section 2-207 cases. Obviously, the characteristics discussed are those commonly found and some may not be present in
certain specific transactions.
Preliminary Negotiations
When the parties are merchants, it is rare for there to have been
no contacts at all prior to an offer being made. Often the parties have
communicated with each other either orally or in writing relating
to the specifics of the transaction. Many times this contact is between
the technical people in the firms who in turn communicate with their
respective salesmen or purchasing agents who carry out the documentation of the transaction. At the very minimum, the seller has
sent out a general catalog or nonspecific price quotations or the buyer
has distributed specifications and invited bids.
It is not unusual for businesses to have almost identical documents with different headings.
Documents entitled "quotation," "acknowledgment" and "confirmation" often contain
precisely the same terms modified only to conform to the heading on the front.
Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1975
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The Offer
If a document is used (generally the case), the offer will be made
by either the buyer transmitting his "purchase order" or by the seller
sending his "quotation form." Either offer form generally contains a
blank portion on which the user types in the basic performance terms
for that transaction. These will include a description of the goods,
the price, the time, delivery terms and the quantity to be purchased.'
In addition, any special or unique terms relating to that particular
transaction will be noted.
The balance of the front and/or back of the form will contain
numerous additional printed terms. 10 These terms will likely consist of
two types. First, there will appear additional substantive terms running the gamut of detailed warranties of quality if it is a buyer's
form, or disclaimer of warranties if it is a seller's form, to standard
payment or delivery requirements. Second, at the behest of the party's
legal department, there will be language attempting to limit any
contract formed - either by the other party's response or the parties'
performance - to the substantive terms set out in the offeror's form.11
On occasion when there has been substantial prior negotiation,
it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the point at which and
the party by whom an offer has been made since numerous documents
have passed between the parties. 12 A similar situation occurs when
the parties enter into a transaction at a face-to-face meeting where
13
agreement is reached orally.
The Response
Sometimes there is no response and the parties merely go on to
perform. More often, the other party will send a document likely
called an "acknowledgment," a "confirmation" or an "acceptance."
If the offer has been made orally or the agreement was completely

I Probably

these are the only terms necessary to ensure that the contract will not fail from
indefiniteness. The subject matter of the contract must be ascertainable, and the Code
will supply all other missing terms but that of quantity. Cf. CODE § 2.201.
10If the printed terms are found solely on the back, there will usually be a conspicuous statement on the front calling attention to the terms on the back in conformity with
§ 1-201 (10) of the Code.
11The following language is typical; the bracketed variations change the clause from buyer's
to seller's language:
By shipping the above goods [receiving and paying for the above goods] or
by acknowledging receipt of this document, or by performing as required above,
you agree to the terms and conditions of sale set forth on the reverse side hereof
as well as those set forth on the face hereof. These terms and conditions
constitute an offer by Buyer [Seller) and may only be accepted on the exact
terms set forth and no other terms and conditions shall be controlling; and these
terms and conditions supersede the terms and conditions of your proposal or
acknowledgment form, if any.
12Such a situation is expressly dealt with in the Code. See CODE § 2-204 (3).
13The contract may not be enforceable because of the Code's Statute of Frauds provision,
§ 2-201. A later memorandum establishing enforceability will not eliminate the difficulty
of determining who is the offeror and who is the offeree.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss2/2
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negotiated orally, both parties may send a response document. Such
forms are typically very similar to the form offer documents with
standard printed terms on the front and/or back and space for typed
repetition of the unique, negotiated terms. The difference lies only
in the fact that the substantive terms will favor the responding party
and there will be language attempting to limit the contract to the
terms of the response.
Post Response
At this juncture, if the negotiated terms match, and usually even
if they do not, the most likely course of events will find the parties
performing. However, on occasion, additional modifying or clarifying
documents will be exchanged.
A few observations are in order at this point. Most of the above
transactions probably take place without either party carefully reading the form portions of the documents sent by the other. In all cases,
however, the typed negotiated terms set out in the offeror's document
will be read by the offeree; otherwise, the offeree/seller would not know
what to manufacture and/or ship, or the offeree/buyer would not know
the terms of purchase. The response document, on the other hand,
may not be checked carefully and completely by the offeror. In addition, given the volume of transactions, standardization of forms and
the level of employees responsible for handling the form, the sending
party may have only the most general idea of what is contained in
his own form.14 In most circumstances the concern of both the buyer
and seller will be to close a deal as quickly as possible and questions
about subsidiary terms may often be postponed in the belief that any
dispute will be resolved some time later.
Pre-Code Rule
Under the pre-Code common law rule, a response to an offer was
effective as an acceptance only if the terms of the response (s) exactly
matched those of the offer. Either a variation of the terms of the offer
in the response or the addition of novel terms caused the response to
fail as an acceptance. The botton line result in either case was that
no contract was formed. While not all courts felt comfortable with
such a strict formulation and some sought fictions to avoid its application,15 by and large the requirement was rigidly enforced.16 This
agents participating in a university continuing
education program whether they could summarize the specifics of just a few of the
boilerplate provisions on forms they regularly used. Most could not.
75See, e.g., Milliken-Tomlinson Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 9 F.2d 809 (1st Cir. 1925)
(insertion of a term which would have been implied in fact from the offer); Southern
Bitulithic Co. v. Algiers Ry. & Lighting Co., 130 La. 830, 58 So. 588 (1912) (stipulation
in conformity with trade usage).
16See, e.g., Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 216 N.Y. 310, 110 N.E. 619 (1915).
This case is considered a classic example. The court held that the mere statement in
the response - "The acceptance of this order which in any event you must promptly
acknowledge ....
- was a sufficient change in the offer to result in the response being
ineffective as an acceptance.
14One of the authors asked purchasing
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approach became known as the "mirror image" rule. The alleged virtue

of the mirror image rule was that it promoted greater certainty
between the parties.17 As a result of its application, both parties would
know what their obligations were because no contract would be formed
until the terms of the offer and the response matched exactly. The
assumption on which this theory was based had to be that both parties
were aware, not only of each and every term in the the other party's
offer or acceptance, but of each and every term contained in their
own offer or acceptance. While such certainty might have been attainable in a time when commercial contracts were personally negotiated
and original documents created for each transaction, it is not difficult
to see that the complexity and needs of the modern commercial transaction made such knowledge virtually impossible. As a result, parties
who were "certain" that they had a binding contract at the time they
exchanged their forms often found themselves without protection if
the other chose not to perform. The non-performing party merely had
to find the slightest variation between the offer and the response,
usually tucked away in the printed terms portion of the parties' forms,
to sustain his position that no contract had been established. The
availability of such an "out" gave rise to the real possibility that
many refusals to perform were not due to concern over differences
in terms, but rather to a change in market conditions which made
withdrawal from the transaction economically advantageous for the
non-performing party. 8
Even greater problems were likely to arise when no contract was
formed under the mirror image rule but the parties nevertheless went
on to perform. Since the response was not the mirror image of the
offer, it not only was ineffective as an acceptance, but also had the
effect of rejecting the offer. The response was effective as a counterproposal, however, and at that point it became the outstanding offer.1 9
When the parties thereafter performed, the action of performance by
the original offeror became the necessary acceptance of the counterproposal, however, and at that point it became the outstanding offer. 19
counter-proposal. Thus, the application of the mirror image rule had
the effect of arbitrarily preferring the party sending the last document
in the commercial transaction. This result also achieved a popular
name in the literature - the "last shot" approach. 21 The application
17

"The merit of the common-law standard for commercial transactions lay in the relatively
high degree of certainty which it engendered." Comment, The Uniform Commercial Code

and Contract Law: Some Selected Problems,supra note 5, at 853.
18In Raisler Heating Co. v. Clinton Wire Cloth Co., 168 N.Y.S. 668 (Sup. Ct. 1918), for
example, the seller sought to withdraw, after the market price of the goods had doubled,
on the grounds that the specification furnished by the buyer differed significantly from
the seller's offer.
19 1 WILLISTON & THOMPSON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 77 (rev. ed. 1936).
20

Id. § 22A.
e.g., Comment, Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code, supra note 5.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss2/2
21See,
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of the mirror image rule and the last shot approach often left an
offeror in the uncomfortable position of being bound to the terms
of the offeree if the parties performed, but with no enforceable contractual rights if the offeree chose to withdraw. These problems were
prominent concerns when section 2-207 was proposed.
The Rule of Section 2-207
Section 2-207 reads as follows:
Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or
a written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time
operates as an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless
acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the
additional or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals
for addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms
become part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms
of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been
given or is given within a reasonable time after
notice of them is received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale
although the writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract. In such case the terms of the particular contract consist of those terms on which the writings of the
parties agree, together with any supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions of this Act.
The general approach and structure of section 2-207 is clear.
Subsection (1) determines when a contract is created as a result of
an exchange between the parties. In response to the realities of the
modern commercial transaction, the rigid requirements of the mirror
image rule have been abolished. Under the provisions of subsection
(1), the response is effective as an acceptance, creating a contract,
"even though it states terms additional to or different from those
offered ...."2 While the response need not exactly match the offer,
the response containing additional or different terms must meet two
requirements to be effective as an acceptance. First, it must be couched
22Compare this express statement of intention to eliminate the mirror image rule with the
new Restatement position, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 60 (Tent. Draft
No. 1, 1964), which one writer suggested has the same result by implication. Murray,
supra note 3, at 345.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1975
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in terms of a "definite and seasonable expression of acceptance" and
second, it must not be "expressly made conditional on assent to the
additional or different terms." The Code test of an operative acceptance under section 2-207 was thus designed to bring about a closer
correlation between the controlling legal principles and the commercial
23
understanding of when a "deal" had been closed.
The contract that is thus created by the parties' exchange is
based - at least insofar as material terms are concerned - on the
terms contained in the offeror's form. Subsection (2) is not concerned
with the question of whether a response is in fact an acceptance. This
is determined solely under subsection (1). Subsection (2) is intended
only to resolve the effect of the additional and/or different terms 24
contained in the response which subsection (1) has already deemed an
acceptance. Subsection (2) establishes two separate tracks for handling these variant terms depending on the characteristics of the
parties. If the parties to the contract are not both merchants, the
offeree's variant terms are "proposals for addition to the contract."
25
The offeror can either agree to their inclusion or not as he wishes.
If the parties to the contract are both merchants, the variant terms
automatically become part of the contract unless (a) the offeror has
stated in his offer that he will agree only on the basis of his terms,
(b) the variant terms will materially alter the existing contract, or
(c) the offeror has already objected or thereafter objects within a
reasonable time to the variant terms. The effect of subsection (2) is
to allow changes in the contract which is based on the offeror's terms,
only if they are found to be non-material. However, even non-material
terms will fail to become part of the contract if the offeror objects
to them either generally in advance or after receipt.
The result of the application of the subsections (1) and (2) is
to form a contract at the time of the exchange between the parties,
which is based essentially on the offeror's terms. Thus, the inequity
fostered by the common law rules which enabled a party to withdraw
easily when market conditions changed presumably has been remedied.

2 See CODE
24

§ 2-207, Comment 2.

There has been much debate as to whether subsection (2) encompasses "different" as
well as additional terms and the scholarly comment is approximately evenly divided.
Compare, e.g., Curman, supra note 3 (different not included), with Lipman, supra note 3.
Section 2-207 itself is ambiguous. It uses only the word "additional" in subsection (2) after
having referred to "additional to or different from" in subsection (1). Comment 3, however, states: "Whether or not additional or different terms will become part of the
agreement depends upon the provisions of subsection (2)." For the authors' view on this
issue see the text accompanying notes 51 to 62 inIra.
25Since these terms, if accepted, would be modifications of an existing contract, no additional
consideration would be required. CODE, § 2-209(1).
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss2/2
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Subsection (3) addresses the typical situation where, despite the
fact that no contract has been created by the parties' exchange under6
the provisions of subsection (1), the parties, nevertheless, perform.
Under the pre-Code rule the last shot approach would apply and the
contract would be formed on the terms contained in the offeree's
response. When subsection (3) applies, however, since performance
requires the finding of some contractual relationship, the contract
consists of the terms on which the offer and the response agree,
"together with any supplementary terms incorporated under any other
terms of ... [the Code]." The effect of the application of subsection
(3) is to eliminate any preference for the terms of either the offeror
27
or the offeree in a performance situation.
Thus, it would seem that the drafters of section 2-207 have attempted to cure the two basic problems that resulted when the common
law rules were applied to the exchange of commercial forms. The language of section 2-207 indicates that the offeror will be protected
during the executory stage and that the contract which is formed
on the basis of performance will no longer give a preference to the
party making the last response. However laudable the intent of the
drafters, it is necessary to determine whether or not their attempts
were effective. This question can only be resolved by considering what
problems of application and result, if any, have arisen through use
of section 2-207 over the past 21 years. It is to this inquiry we now turn.
An Interpretive History of Section 2-207
Review of the literature and cases relating to section 2-207 identifies
five general problem areas in the interpretation of the language of the
section. They are as follows: (a) What constitutes "a definite and
seasonable expression of acceptance" which is not expressly "made
conditional on assent to the additional or different terms"? (b) What
is the meaning in subsection (1) of "a written confirmation" operating as an acceptance? (c) Does subsection (2) deal with both
"additional and different" terms or only "additional" terms? (d)
When may a court include a variant term contained in a response
in a contract created under subsection (1)? And, (e) what is the
effect of performance when no contract has been formed under subsection (1) ?

26

This provision does not apply to a situation where an offer is made, the offeree does not
respond, and the parties perform under circumstances in which the offeree's performance
constitutes the necessary acceptance under §§ 2-204(1) and 2-206 of the Code. The
terms of the contract would be those contained in the offer, and neither parry would
be bound until there was performance.

Murray, suPr4 note1975
3.
Published 27
byAccord,
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What constitutes "a definite and seasonable expression of
acceptance" which is not expressly "made conditional
on assent to the additionalor different terms"?
Logically, it would seem that these are two separate issues. One
should first determine whether or not the response is an acceptance,
and then if it is, determine whether or not the offeree has made it
expressly conditional. However, the initial difficulty encountered by
the courts in applying subsection (1) lay in dealing with the inclusion
of materially variant terms in the response. Some courts and commentators viewed the inclusion of such terms as affecting the determination of what was a definite expression of acceptance, while others
contended it went to the issue of whether or not the acceptance was
conditional. In either event, whether the inclusion of such terms
resulted in a determination that no definite acceptance had been
made, or that even though a definite acceptance was made it was
conditional, the conclusion was the same; the response was no more
than a counter-proposal and no contract was formed. Thus it is
necessary, at least initially, to treat these questions concurrently.
The now famous, but highly criticized case of Roto-Lith, Ltd. v.
F. P. Bartlett & Co.28 was the first example of a court holding
that the inclusion of materially variant terms turned the response into
a counter-proposal. In that case the offeree/seller's acknowledgment
and invoice sent in response to offeror/buyer's written order contained
in the printed terms an exclusion of express and implied warranties.
The court argued that
[i]f plaintiff's contention is correct that a reply to an offer
stating additional or different conditions unilaterally burdensome upon the offeror is a binding acceptance of the
original offer plus simply a proposal for the additional conditions, the statute would lead to an absurdity. Obviously no
29
offeror will subsequently assent to such conditions.
The court therefore held:
To give the statute a practical construction we must hold
that a response which states a condition materially altering

28297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962). Articles critical of the court's reasoning include Murray,
supra note 3; Comment, Contracts-an Interpretation of the Uniform Commercial Code
Section 2-207(1) ....
, supra note 5; Comment, Section 2-207 and the "Counter Offer":
Acceptance Unlimited, supra note 5; Comment, Nonconforming Acceptances Under
2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code, supra note 5; Comment, Section 2-207 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, supra note 5; 76 HARv. L. REv. 1481 (1963); 111 U. PA.
L. REv. 132 (1962). But see Note, Uniform Commercial Code: Variation Between
Offer and Acceptance Under Section 2-207, 1962 DUKE L.J. 613, 617 ("the
interpretation adopted by the First Circuit Court of Appeals commends itself to other
UCC jurisdictions as an equitable recognition of reasonable comercial expectation.");
Comment, A Look at a Strict Construction of Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, supra note 5.
29
Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497, 500 (1st Cit. 1962).
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss2/2
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the obligation solely to the disadvantage of the offeror is
conditional on assent to the
an 'acceptance... expressly...
3
...terms.'
additional
This position reflected the old pre-Code view that no offeree would
knowingly agree to the offeror's terms if the offeree still had additional or different terms he wanted included in the contract. The
offeree's acceptance would remove any leverage he might have to
induce the offeror to agree to the new or different terms. Further,
only the most benevolent of offerors, freed from the danger that the
offeree might withdraw from the negotiations, would accede to a
material change requested by the offeree. Yet, it is clear, notwithstanding the somewhat misleading statements in Comment 1,31 that
the drafters, in fact, intended a response that contained variant
terms which materially altered the offer to be effective as an unconditional acceptance. If, in every case, a term in the response which
would materially alter the offer resulted in a counter-proposal then
there would never be a situation to which subsection (2) (b) could
apply. By its terms, subsection (2) (b) contemplates a contract formed
under subsection (1) where the variant terms materially alter the
32
contract and are thus not includable without agreement by the offeree.
The explanation for the approach of section 2-207 in establishing a new, much broader concept of acceptance lies in the recognition
that section 2-207 was intended to apply to modern commercial transactions where there is almost exclusive reliance on form documents.
As a consequence, the Roto-Lith court's arguments regarding the
offeree's expectations are subject to qualification. Thus, it is
necessary, to apply properly section 2-207, to differentiate between
variant terms which the offeree made part of the actual negotiation and those which are found tucked away - although conspicuous
as defined by the Code 33 - in the printed terms. The use of variant
terms in the typed portion of a response which materially alter the
terms actively under negotiation certainly should not be deemed a
definite and seasonable expression of acceptance.3 4 In such a case, the
Id.

30
31

32

"The other situation is offer and acceptance, in which a wire or a letter expressed an
acceptance or the closing of an agreement adds further minor suggestions or proposals ...."
CODE § 2-207, Comment 1 (emphasis added). One commentator has suggested that Comment 1 be revised to remove the misleading statement. Lipman, supra note 3.
See CODE

§ 2-207, Comment 3:

Whether or not additional or different terms will become part of the agreement
depends upon the provisions of subsection (2). If they are such as materially to
alter the orginal bargain, they will not be included unless expressly agreed to by
the other party. If, however, they are terms which would not so change the
bargain, they will be incorporated unless notice of objection to them has already
been given or is given within a reasonable time (emphasis added).
3CODE
3

§ 1-201 (10).

A variation on this problem that raises a difficult question occurs when the offeree uses
words that are normally considered definite expressions of acceptance such as "I accept"
or "I agree", but also adds, in the typed portion of his response, an additional or different
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Roto-Lith argument that the offeree knows of his additional or
different terms and does not want to be bound until he can attempt to
get them resolved in his favor would be applicable. However, an
additional or different performance or remedy term in the printed
portion of the response does not really affect the present contractual
expectations of the parties to make a "deal" on the negotiated terms.
This is particularly true if the authors' assumption that the offeree
is often not specifically aware of what is contained in his own printed
terms is correct.
Hence, the proper approach in considering the effect of materially
variant terms in the response is to determine whether or not they are
part of and/or affect the terms under active negotiation. If they are
and/or do, then the offeree should not be held to have made a definite
expression of acceptance. Although a finding that the materially
variant terms make the acceptance conditional would have the same
effect as finding no definite acceptance had been made, analysis in
terms of whether or not there is a definite expression of acceptance
is preferable. This approach obviates the need for the court to grapple
with the requirement that the desire to make an acceptance conditional be "expressly made." Since the decision in Roto-Lith, the
courts seem willing to find that an acceptance has occurred even
though terms in the form portion of the response document would
35
materially alter the contract.
If the mere presence of materially variant terms in a response
will not cause the response to be conditional, thereby creating an
express counter-proposal, the issue becomes, what language will have
such an effect? In line with the position taken above that courts
should focus on statements that affect the parties' perceptions at the
time they are entering into the transaction, the language used by the
offeree must at least be phrased in such a manner and displayed in
such a fashion in the response that a reasonable offeror will both see

(Continued from preceding page)
term which materially alters the terms being actively negotiated by the offeror. The underlying question is why the offeree chose to use such an expression. He may have merely
made a mistake, or he may have been trying to make the offeror feel that there was a
binding contract, but on the offeree's terms. We do not believe that the rule applied in
this case should turn on the offeree's intent (particularly since it is difficult to ascertain) but rather on the effect that this contradictory response has on the offeror. If the
offeror was misled, the authors would not be reluctant to see the offeree held to a contract,
and on the offeror's terms. This would have the effect of "visitting] the consequences
of ambiguity on the offeree" (i.e., the party creating it). See Davenport, supra note 3;
Murray, supra note 3; Weeks, supra note 3.
The same type of problem might arise when a prior course of dealing between the
parties or a usage of trade indicates the parties normally understand a particular type of
document, such as a form tided "confirmation" or "acceptance," to be a definite acceptance.
35 See, e.g., Rite Fabrics, Inc. v. Stafford-Higgins Co., 366 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
J.A. Maurer, Inc. v. Singer Co., 7 UCC REP. SErV. 110 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970); Just
Born, Inc. v. Stein, Hall & Co., 59 Pa. D. & C.2d 407 (1971); Air Products and Chems.,
Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 193, 206 N.W.2d 414 (1973).
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss2/2
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it and understand its meaning - that an express counter-proposal
has been made and the negotiations are not closed. The Sixth Circuit
in Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp.36 went beyond this "clear understanding" approach and required that the offeree meet the precise
is expressly
language of subsection (1) by stating that the response
37
conditioned on the offeror's assent to the variant terms.
A Seventh Circuit case, Construction Aggregates Corp. v. HewittRobins, Inc.,38 also has interpreted the conditional acceptance language
of section 2-207. In that case a response "stating that Hewitt-Robins'
acceptance was predicated on certain modifications, 3 9 including a
substituted warranty clause and limitation of consequential damages
(the terms of which were set out in full), was deemed a counterproposal. This approach, requiring neither the clearest possible statement nor the precise words of the section as in Dorton, can be justified
because the language in this case was in a letter rather than a form
document, and the terms the offeree wanted changed were expressly
set out in the response. This would thus seem to satisfy the "clear
understanding" test. Less satisfying is Bickett v. W.R. Grace & Co.,40
where the court held that the attachment of a printed tag to a bag
of seed which both disclaimed warranties and provided for return of
the seed unopened "unless accepted on these terms" met the requirements of subsection (1) for an expressly conditional acceptance. The
explanation for this decision may lie in the fact that the custom
in the trade was never to give warranties on sales of seed. As a result,
the court may have been attempting to avoid a determination that
the shipment of the seed was an acceptance of the offeror's offer which,
by application of the Code, 41 would have included implied warranties.
As much as one might agree with the result, the language by itself
does not seem sufficient to satisfy the requirement of an express
counter-proposal.
While the trend seems to lean toward at least a requirement of
clear and conspicuous language before an acceptance will be found
to be conditional and thus an express counter-proposal, one problem

'6453 F.2d 1161 (6th Cir. 1972).
37
Viewing the Subsection (1)

proviso within the context of the rest of that
Subsection and within the policies of Section 2-207 itself, we believe that it
was inteded to apply to an acceptance which already reveals that the offeree is
unwilling to proceed with the transaction unless he is assured of the offeror's
assent to the additional or different terms therein .... That the acceptance is
predicated on the offeror's assent must be directly and distinctly stated or expressed
rather than implied or left to inference.
Id.at 1168. This view has been followed within the Sixth Circuit, in Baumgold Brothers,
Inc. v. Allan M. Fox Co., East, 375 F. Supp. 807 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
3404 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1968).
19Id. at 508.
40 12 UCC REP. SERv. 629 (W.D. Ky. 1972).
41CODE §§ 2-314, 2-315.
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has yet to be resolved by the courts. Should language such as: "This
acceptance is expressly made conditional on offeror's assent to any
additional or different terms contained herein" in the printed portion
of the response form be sufficient to meet the requirement of conspicuousness? Notice this language itself is referring only to material
additional or different terms contained in the printed portion of the
form. The offeree should not be overly concerned if the variant terms
are nonmaterial, since they will likely be included under subsection
(2) ; or if material variant terms are contained in the typed portion
of the form, since such location should result in the response failing
as a definite acceptance.
If one accepts the authors' basic approach that the court should
deal with the perceptions of the parties at the time of the negotiation
of the agreement, and if one further assumes that the parties generally
only consider the terms in the typed portion of the form document,
then at the very least such conditional language should not be effective
if only found in the printed portion of the form. This does not mean
that the language must be in the typed portion of a form in order
to meet the test of conspicuousness. Certainly putting it in an accompanying letter would have the same effect. The key lies in a determination that the offeror likely saw and understood the offeree's language indicating his intention to be bound only on the terms contained
42
in the response.
This is clearly a perplexing and difficult problem for the courts,
but even more so for the offeree. If the offeree fails to meet whatever
test the courts impose regarding what constitutes a counter-proposal,
he will find himself bound to a contract based essentially on the
offeror's terms with little hope of getting his own additional or
different terms into the contract. Yet, even if the offeree is successful
in making a counter-proposal, the best the offeree can hope for is a
nonpreferential contract to be formed under subsection (3) if the
parties perform, given the present structure of section 2-207. 3 This
is because the parties will rarely have the time or the inclination to
work out the material difference between the printed terms in the
forms. Thus, the offeree's counter-proposal is likely to go unanswered
except by performance.
possible way for the offeree to protect himself is to indicate in his expressly conditional
statement precisely which of the offeror's printed terms he would like to change, and which
of his own printed terms he would like to add, thus bringing these terms clearly into active
negotiation. This is, however, a large burden on the offeree as he would have to carefully
compare his own form with that of the offeror. This is, in effect, what the offeree did
in Construction Aggregates Corp. v. Hewitt-Robins, Inc., 404 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1968).

42 One

is clear that attempts by offerees to include language in their response which will
either immediately form a contract based on the offeree's variant printed terms, or bind
the offeror to these terms if the offeror remains silent or begins performance, is doomed
to failure. Cf. Note, All Quiet on the 2-207 Front?, supra note 4. Nor should such
(Continued on next page)
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss2/2
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What is the meaning in subsection (1) of "a written
confirmation" operating as an acceptance?
Section 2-207 provides that "a written confirmation which is sent
within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance. .. ." At first glance
such a statement seems nonsensical! As the term is generally used, a
confirmation is merely a restatement of an agreement already
reached. 4 Comment 1 reinforces this view by stating that the section
was intended, in part, to cover the situation
where an agreement has been reached either orally or by
informal correspondence between the parties and is followed
by one or both of the parties sending formal memoranda embodying the terms insofar as agreed upon and adding terms
5
not discussed.
The commentators have attempted to resolve the confusion by suggesting that the drafters intended the written confirmation language
to apply to a situation where, because of the Statute of Frauds requirement of section 2-201, the prior oral agreement is not binding
and it is the written confirmation that makes the contract effective. 46
They argue that since it is the sending of the written confirmation that
makes the agreement binding, it is operating as an acceptance.
While the courts have clearly applied the written confirmation
language to the oral contract situation, 7 a sound argument can be
made that the language does more than just equate a written confirmation to an acceptance when an oral contract becomes binding.
Such language may also be intended to bring under the operation of
subsection (2) the variant terms in any document sent by either
party after an agreement was formed. This approach would allow
variant terms, whether found in an actual acceptance or a written
confirmation, to be handled under subsection (2). However, as indicated above, only a response to an offer could result in the finding
that either no definite acceptance had been made or the acceptance

(Continued from preceding page)
language be considered sufficient to make the acceptance conditional even if inserted in the
typed portion of the form. This is the most blatant example of an unthinking "battle of
the forms" and should be ignored by the courts. The battle of the forms has produced
some truly extraordinary (and meaningless) language where lawyers have attempted to
insure that their clients will always prevail. One purchase order reviewed by the authors
contained the following clause in conspicuous print. REJECTION OF THIS ORDER MUST
BE MADE BY RETURN MAIL. The provision was followed by language reserving the
right of the buyer to revoke his "offer."
44BENDER'S U.C.C. SERVICE, DUSENBERG & KING, BULK SALES AND TRANSFERS § 3.03 [1),
at 3-15 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 3 BENDER'S U.C.C. SERVICE].
4
1CODE § 2-207, Comment 1 (emphasis added).
46 See, e.g., Davenport, supra note 3.
47
Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161 (6th Cir. 1972); American Parts Co. v.
American Arb. Ass'n, 8 Mich. App. 156, 154 N.W.2d 5 (1967); Ohio Grain Co. v.
15 UCCREP. SERV.
Published bySwisshelm,
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was expressly conditional resulting in a counter-proposal. The written
confirmation, coming as it does after the agreement has been made,
could have no such effect.4 Thus, for example, the inclusion in a
written confirmation of the language "this confirmation is expressly
conditional on the assent by you of the additional or different terms
contained herein" would not create a counter-proposal. The variant
terms in the written confirmation would be treated as contained in
an effective acceptance and included or excluded in the contract under
the provisions of subsection (2) .49
A somewhat different case would exist where the parties have
executed a written document which by its terms is not effective
until accepted in writing by the home office of one of the parties.
If the home office sends a written confirmation, it is in reality an
acceptance of an outstanding offer represented by the prior document. Such a written confirmation should be treated as a normal
response document to an offer. 0
Does subsection (2) deal with both "additional and
different" terms or only "additional terms"?
Although subsection (1) considers both additional and different
terms contained in a response to determine whether or not an acceptance has been made, subsection (2), which determines what variant
terms in the acceptance will be included in the contract, refers only
to additional terms. This raises the issue of whether the omission of
"different" in subsection (2) was intended by the drafters to mean
that such terms cannot be included in a contract formed under subsection (1). Comment 3 further confuses the issue by stating:
"whether or not additional or different terms will become part of
the agreement depends upon the provisions of subsection (2)."
4

It is important, howcvcr, to diffcrcntiatc bctwecn a writtcn confirmation form used as an
acceptance of an oral offer not previously accepted and one sent after oral agreement. Cf.
Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161 (6th Cit. 1972). The possibility also

exists that if the written confirmation document changed so many terms that it no longer
reflected the prior oral agreement, it would no longer meet the memorandum requirements
of § 2-201. American Parts Co. v. American Arb. Ass'n, 8 Mich. App. 156, 154 N.W.2d
5 (1967).
49 This is in effect the court's position in American Parts:
While section 2207 literally provides that an acceptance can expressly be "made
conditional on assent to the additional or different terms," it omits to state that a
"written confirmation" can so provide, and we conclude that the omission was a
deliberate choice by the experienced, careful draftsmen of the uniform commercial
code. We add that any other construction would be opposed to the policy of
section 2207.
8 Mich. App. at 174, 154 N.W.2d at 15. Cf. Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d
1161 (6th Cit. 1972). Contra, Southwest Eng. Co. v. Martin Tractor Co., 473 P.2d 18
(Kan. 1970). This case may be explainable since the letter in question purported to be
not a modifying document but rather a rejection of an offer.
5 This situation was suggested in Lorensen, The Uniform Commercial Code Sales Article
Compared with West Virginia Law, 64 W. VA. L. REV. 32 (1961). The author contended
that the written confirmation language of subsection (1) applied. To the extent that
Dean Lorensen would argue such a document should not be accorded the full rights of a
response to an offer, we believe that he is incorrect.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss2/2
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Although this is an issue to which a substantial amount of
scholarly comment has been directed,51 initially, one wonders why so
much controversy has been generated. While subsection (2) determines which variant terms in the offeree's acceptance will be incorporated into the contract without the offeror's approval if the parties
are merchants; given the language of (a), (b) and (c) of subsection
(2), only the most inoffensive of terms, whether different or additional, are likely to find their way into the contract. Subsection (2)
(b) immediately excludes any variant terms if they would materially
alter the contract while (a) and (b) give the offeror a means of
excluding even non-material terms from the contract formed under
subsection (1) if he so desires.5 2 Nonetheless, the argument continues.
At least three cases have held that subsection 2-207(2) requires
a distinction between additional and different terms.5 3 On the other
hand, while not directly holding that a distinction should not be
made, one case dealt with a factual situation which implied that
there was no distinction.5 If the case arises in either Wisconsin or
Iowa, the courts will make no distinction since the words "or different" have been added to the language of subsection (2) in those
state statutes.55
In the authors' opinion there are several strong reasons supporting the interpretation that no distinction between additional or different terms should be made in applying subsection (2). Although
it would seem on first impression that it would be easy to identify
situations where a term in the response clearly differs from an express term contained in the offer, in fact the actual process of identification may prove frustrating and surprisingly complex. 6 To add
to the confusion, one can argue that a term found only in the response
SERVICE, supra note 44, § 3.03;
Note, In Defense of the Battle of Forms ....supra note 4 (noting or favoring the distinction); Murray, supra note 3; Comment, Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
supra note 5 (opposed).
s2Section 2-207 (a) and the first part of (b) allow the offeror to exclude the non-material
variant terms, in a blanket manner, without prior knowledge of what they are. Since this
can be done automatically, it would seem that few, if any, variant terms would be
included under subsection (2).
" Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1181 (6th Cir. 1972); American Parts Co.,
v. American Arb. Ass'n, 8 Mich. App. 156, 154 N.W.2d 5 (1967); Air Prod. and Chems.,
Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 193, 206 N.W.2d 414 (1973).

-5For additional scholarly comment, see BENDER'S U.C.C.

s4Rite Fabrics, Inc. v. Stafford-Higgins Co., 366 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The court
in Rite Fabrics considered under § 2-207 a variant term in the response which was clearly
different from one in the offer, without reference to the additional/different issue. See also
J.A. Maurer v. Singer Co., 7 UCC REP. SERV. 110 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970) (the court
characterized a limitation of consequential damages clause as an additional term without
addressing the issue of the distinction).
55"(2) The additional or different terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to
the contract." WIS. STAT. § 402.207 (1964). Identical language in IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 554.2207 (1967).
s One source indicates that the language "f.o.b. common carrier" in a response may be
analyzed as either an additional or different term when the offer contained the language
"f.o.b. truck." 3 BENDER'S U.C.C. SERVICE, supra note 44, § 3.03(11, at 3-35 to 3-36
(1975).
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but contrary to a term implied by the Code s7 is a different, rather
than additional, term. One court failed to consider this possibility
and applied the literal language of the section holding that an
express term contradicting an implied term was "additional." 8 The
result is that terms which the offeror did not bother to include in the
offer because they were implied by the Code would be treated differently from those where the offeror repeated the Code term expressly.
It is further disquieting to find that two of the courts 9 which have
imposed a distinction between additional and different terms offered
no justification whatsoever and a third, after recognizing that there
was a counter argument, advanced a single, highly questionable
argument as support for imposing such a distinction. The latter
case, Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc.,60
cites American Parts Co. v. American Arb. Ass'n,6 1 as having limited
the application of subsection (2) to additional terms because:
The policy of Section 2-207 is that the parties should be
able to enforce their agreement, . . . if enforcement can be
granted without requiring either party to be bound to a
62
material term to which he has not agreed.
The court in Air Products continued:
The implication seems clear. A party cannot be expected to
63
have assented to a different term.
In fact, the court in American Parts does not appear to have
offered any justification for making the distinction other than the
language of subsection (2). Moreover, the quote emphasized by the
Air Products opinion refers to a "material term" and thus does not
appear to be speaking to the problems under subsection (2) at all.
Even if it were, the argument applies equally well to an additional
term and does not justify the dichotomy between the two. Unless
some policy justification relating to a significant variance between
additional and different terms is advanced, there appears to be no
basis for making such a distinction.
When may a court include a variant term contained in the
response in a contract created under subsection (1)?
This is an issue of substantial concern to those who find themselves in the position of offeree. The offeree who makes a definite,
7 E.g., §2-308, supplying place of delivery if not otherwise agreed; §2-310, providing
payment terms; and §§ 2-314, 2-315, implying warranties.
s J.A. Maurer, Inc. v. Singer Co., 7 UCC REp. SERV. 110 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970).
S Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161 (6th Cir. 1972); American Parts
Co. v. American Arb. Ass'n, 8 Mich. App. 156, 154 N.W.2d 5 (1967).
6058 Wis. 2d 193, 206 N.W.2d 414 (1973).
618 Mich. App. 156, 154 N.W.2d 5 (1967).
62Id. at 423-24.
63 Id.at 424.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss2/2
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non-conditional acceptance will be bound to a contract based on the
offeror's terms, except as to variant terms contained in the response
which are includable under subsection (2). The more narrowly subsection (2) is interpreted by the courts, the less likely any of the
offeree's terms will find their way into the contract.
Two arguments can be advanced in favor of limiting the introduction of offeree terms into the contract. First since subsection (2)
will generally apply only to questions involving terms in the printed
portion of the form which are not part of the active negotiation, the
offeree is unlikely to be severely disadvantaged. The underlying
assumption suggesting this argument is that terms not in active
negotiation are not likely to be very significant in the contract transaction. Such an assumption, however, is inconsistent with the fact
that almost all of the disputes that have arisen under section 2-207
have been over rights and procedures upon breach contained in the
printed portions of the forms." Thus, it seems clear that a narrowly
construed subsection (2) will result in the offeree losing more often in
disputes deemed sufficiently important by the parties to warrant
litigating the issue.
The second argument is a corollary to the first. If the issues found
in the printed terms are really the important ones, then the offeree
can protect himself merely by bringing them into the active negotiation, thus making the response not a definite expression of acceptance. Even if he is not willing to do that, the offeree can exercise
the right to make his acceptance conditional thus making an express
counter-proposal without having to pinpoint the precise terms he
wishes accepted before he will agree." This argument fails to take
into account the realities of modern commercial transactions noted
above. In the first place, as emphasized repeatedly, one must differentiate between issues that are important at the time of negotiation, and those that become important at the time of breach. It
is the former which will be drawn into active negotiation and the
latter which, by their very nature, will continue to be ignored. In
the second place, the more general approach of making the acceptance conditional on the acceptance of the offeree's variant terms, no

the twenty-five cases surveyed by the authors which directly applied §2-207,
twenty-two involved issues relating to remedies and procedures on breach; three involved
inclusion or exclusion of arbitration clauses; five involved exclusion or conflict of warranties;
three involved limitation of liability and one involved a unique industry risk of loss
provision. Further, one of the two cases involving performance terms was the only case
found which did not concern a contract between merchants, and thus it was not really
a commercial form case. See McAfee v. Brewer, 214 Va. 579, 203 S.F.2d 129 (1974).

64Of
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matter what they are, forces the offeree to run the risk of losing the
deal when he does not even know which terms are a problem and
does not have the time to find out.
One can argue that the failure to interpret subsection (2) narrowly
ignores the traditional common law rule that the offeror is the master
of his offer. If a contract is to be formed it must be on the offeror's
terms. This rule is based on the view that an offeree will always know
all of the terms of the offer and thus when he accepts his reasonable
expectation is that he will be bound by those terms. However, the
fallacy of this approach is one of the very reasons that section 2-207
was created. Because of the commercial setting, the terms involved
in a later litigation will rarely be known to the offeree at the time of
negotiation. Consequently, caution must be observed in drawing any
conclusions that the parties have, are likely to have, or should have
any specific expectation at all concerning "non-actively negotiated"
terms.
If this view properly reflects the commercial situation, and we
believe it does, then it follows that subsection (2) should be read
broadly enough to include the offeree's reasonable terms at least part
of the time. If this occurs, then the issue of inclusion of different
as well as additional terms will become proportionately more
important.
This brings us to a consideration of the meaning and application
of subparts (a), (b) and (c) of subsection (2). The issue of whether
the offeror has or has not objected to a specific term in the response
within a reasonable time after receiving it is an easy question of fact.
Subparts (a) and (b), however, offer more difficulty. To date, only one
5
case has applied (a) directly. In re Tunis Manufacturing Corp.1
involved the applicability of an arbitration clause contained in an
invoice sent by the offeree in response to a purchase order. In the
printed terms portion of the purchase order the offeror had stated
that no change in the order could be made without the buyer's written
acceptance. The court held that this language met the requirement
of expressly limiting the acceptance to the terms of the offer. This
decision raises the question of how far an offeror must go to be
deemed to have limited the contract to only his terms. We believe,
at the very minimum, the offeror should be required to make it clear
to the offeree what the offeree is getting himself into if he sends a
definite and seasonable acceptance. This is no more than the reverse
of the obligation on the part of the offeree to make sure that the
offeror knows the acceptance is conditional and the parties are not
yet bound. 66 At least if the offeree is made definitely aware that none
UCC REP. SERV. 544 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972).
See text accompanying notes 36 to 42 supra.

65 11
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of his variant terms will be inserted in the contract because any
acceptance will be limited solely to the terms of the offer, the offeree
can make a commercially reasonable choice. Either, he can take the
time to scrutinize both forms and identify and resolve differences that disturb him before accepting or he can make an
expressly conditional acceptance containing his preferred terms which
may endanger the deal. Finally, he can take his chances that no
problems will arise and merely make a definite, unconditional acceptance. To ensure that the offeree will know that he must choose between
these alternatives, the courts should require that the language limiting acceptance to the terms of the offer be as clear as possible and be
displayed in a manner that will bring it to the attention of the
offeree. In our view the best way to accomplish this would be to require that the offeror's intention must be clearly stated in 67the typed
portion of the form document or in an accompanying letter.
Subsection (2) (b) has been the subject of far more litigation and
has, at least to date, been one of the centers of controversy over the
application of section 2-207. The problem is that "material" is nowhere
defined in the Code. The experience under the cases has been varied
and mixed to date. Some courts have found, for instance, that an
a matter of law8
arbitration clause constitutes a material variance as
69
while another has come to the opposite conclusion.
Ironically, even though there are two comments to section 2-207
dealing specifically with the question of material variance, they are
not in fact very helpful in indicating the intention of the drafters.
Comment 4 attempts to provide guidance by citing examples of clauses
7 The

ambiguity as to when an offeror has qualified under subsection (2) (a) could be
eliminated by an amendment adding the following language to the subsection:
No acceptance will be expressly limited to the terms of the offer unless the offer
conspicously contains the following language: "acceptance may occur only by
returning a signed copy of this document or by performance without any further
response, and acceptance may not involve any other document or terms."
Such a change would have several benefits. First, it provides the offeror with a surefire,
precise method of limiting acceptance to his terms; the offeror does not have to depend
upon the interpretative inclination of a court. Second, by virtue of the conspicuousness
requirement and the specified language, it enables the offeree to identify those situations
in which his variances will always be disallowed. If the offeree chooses to use some other
document to reply, it would be proper for the courts to find no definite expression of
acceptance had occurred and consider the transaction under subsection (3) if the parties
perform. Finally, if the offeree responds with a different document, the offeror would be
alerted to the fact that the offeree is probably suggesting other terms. This allows the
offeror to choose to perform or not, as he sees fit. Subsection 2(a) only applies to
situations between merchants. The imposition, if any, in requiring the use of specific
language, would be consistent with the Code's basic approach of holding merchants to
higher standards. The problem with this approach is that it brings into the determination
of when a definite acceptance has been made under subsection (1) an additional confusing element.
6Application of Doughboy Indus., Inc., 17 App. Div. 2d 216, 233 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1962)
(dictum); In re Barclay Knitwear Co., 8 UCC REP. SERv. 44 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970);
Trafalgar Square, Ltd. v. Reeves Bros., 7 UCC REP. SERv. 712 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970);
Just Born, Inc. v. Stein, Hall & Co., 59 Pa. D. & C.2d 407 (1971).
6 Silverstyle Dress Co. v. Aero-Knit Mills, Inc., 11 UCC REP. SERv. 292 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Published by 1972).
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representing material terms, while Comment 5 provides specific examples of nonmaterial terms."0 The basic test of materiality suggested
by the comments seems to be whether the terms would involve "unreasonable surprise." Yet certain of the clauses deemed material
would be normal custom not likely to cause surprise to the offeror,
while some of the examples of nonmaterial terms appear contrary to
custom and practice.7 1 An additional difficulty with the use of examples to define materiality is its tendency to lead to per se rules.
As aptly stated by Duesenberg and King:
What is and what is not material is an enormously complex
issue, dependent upon a variety of circumstances almost as
broad as human conduct itself. A variance in one situation

70

CODE § 2-207, Comment 4:
Examples of typical clauses which would normally "materially alter" the contract
and so result in surprise or hardship if incorporated without express awareness
by the other party are: a clause negating such standard warranties as that of
merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose in circumstances in which
either warranty normally attaches; a clause requiring a guaranty of 90% or 100%
deliveries in a case such as a contract by cannery, where the usage of the trade
allows greater quantity leeways; a clause reserving to the seller the power to
cancel upon the buyer's failure to meet any invoice when due; a clause requiring that complaints be made in a time materially shorter than customary
or reasonable.
CODE § 2-207, Comment 5:
Examples of clauses which involve no element of unreasonable surprise and which
therefore are to be incorporated in the contract unless notice of objection is
seasonably given are: a clause setting forth and perhaps enlarging slightly upon
the seller's exemption due to supervening causes beyond his control, similar to
those covered by the provision of this Article on merchant's excuse by failure
of presupposed conditions or a clause fixing in advance any reasonable formula
of proration under such circumstances; a clause fixing a reasonable time for complaints within customary limits, or in the case of a purchase for sub-sale,
providing for inspection by the subpurchaser; a clause providing for interest on
overdue invoices or fixing the seller's standard credit terms where they are
within the range of trade practice and do not limit any credit bargained for; a
clause limiting the right of rejection for defects which fall within the customary
trade tolerance for acceptance "with adjustment" or other'ise limiting remedy
in a reasonable manner.
71 See 3 BENDER'S U.C.C. SERVICE, supra note 44, § 3.03(11.
When closely examined, this official explanatory comment on the term "material"
may create more problems in interpretation than it solves. If the examples given
are to serve as guidelines for identifying what is a material term, quarrel may
be raised with the inclusion among them of an additional term which is nothing
more than what, without its express statement, would otherwise be impled under
the Code. That is exactly what is involved when the right of cancellation in the
event of a buyer's failure to pay an invoice when due is given as an example.

Payment of the price when it is due is the buyer's primary obligation of performance. Additionally, Section 2-703 specifically permits a seller to cancel where the
buyer, among other things, fails to make payment when due. If he does not pay
when payment is due, should he be heard to assert surprise at the expressed term?
The example of the Official Comment is poor from another analytical view.
If a term stared on a responsive document merely iterates what the law would
otherwise impose, it is arguably not an additional term. This would be true
whether the term were implied by operation of a Code section, through custom
and usage, prior course of dealing, or any other means by which a matter on
which the parties are silent nonetheless becomes a part of their agreement. A
written provision which states what an agreement already includes is no alteration
at all. If it is no alteration, it cannot be either an additional term or material.
(Continued on next
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss2/2
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may be material, but not in another. Factors such as the
amount involved in a transaction, both in dollars and in
quantity, the posture of the parties to each other, the nature
of the marketplace, custom and usage, intention, and comduct in reliance on a variance are all relevant to determining
materiality, and a serious question may be raised as to the
propriety of the in vacuo examples of the comments as guide2
posts.7
This view deserves broad endorsement. Only by giving consideration to the whole range of factors mentioned in the above quotation,
particularly custom and usage both between the parties and within
the industry, can the courts fairly determine which of the offeree's
terms should be turned aside as a material alteration.73 Certainly, if
the disputing parties in the past, or similar parties as a matter of
practice, normally include the variant term in their contract, it is
difficult for the offeror to argue that its inclusion will result in undue
surprise. If this approach is taken, the rather large area of discretion available to the courts on this issue will not be reduced and
may in fact be enlarged. Such a risk is necessary if the reasonable
expectations of offerees as to their variant terms are to be served at
least to some extent. The more restrictive approach will almost surely
force offerees to make only counterproposals in hopes that the Code
will add some of the variant terms under subsection (3) when and if
the parties subsequently perform.7 4 The making of such counterproposals will have the result of creating the same uncertainty during
the executory phase of a transaction that existed under the common law
rules, and one of the prime objectives of section 2-207 will be lost.

(Continued from preceding page)
This is the underlying principle of the many common law decisions which did
not prevent a purported acceptance from operating as such simply because a
term was added which otherwise would have been implied by law. The Comments
to Section 2-207, discussing "material," seem to have slipped up by including
an example which even under the strict concepts of exact acceptance under
the common law would not likely have converted the acceptance into a counteroffer. And this in the Comments to a section allegedly designed to liberalize the
effects of the common law mirror image rule and to clarify the pre-Code
confusion!
Id. at 3-24 to -26 (footnotes omitted).
72Id. at 3-28 to -29.
73A question of relative materiality might arise concerning this issue. It is not difficult to
imagine circumstances in which a term is of considerable import to one party and
of little or no import to the other. From whose perspective is the factual question of
materiality to be determined? One commentator has argued, perhaps only intending to be
fatuous, that the mere fact that a party seeks to litigate over a term makes it, by
definition, material. Comment, Contracts - an Interpretation of the Uniform Commercial
Code Section 2-207(1), supra note 5.
74Such technique has been suggested by several "practical" commentaries. See, e.g., Lipman,
the 2-207 Front?, supra note 4.

note 3; Note, All Quiet
Published bysupra
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What is the effect of performance when no contract has
been formed under subsection (1) ?
This question raises the issue of the proper interpretation of subsection (3). Although the courts have yet to clearly articulate the
range of alternatives, two possible approaches to the timely application of subsection (3) are discernable. The first is somewhat restrictive. It would provide that when no contract was formed under
subsection (1) because the response was not a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance, and the parties subsequently performed,
subsection (3) would apply. However, if no contract was formed under
subsection (1) because the response, while a definite and seasonable
expression of acceptance, was expressly made conditional on assent to
the variant terms, the response would be treated like a common law
counter-proposal and the offeror's performance would be the necessary
acceptance of the offeree's terms. In this situation, subsection (3)
would not apply.
The second approach to the application of subsection (3) would
result in the use of subsection (3) any time no contract was formed
under subsection (1) regardless of whether the failure to form a
contract was because there was no definite and seasonable expression
of acceptance, or because the acceptance was conditional and the
parties then performed. Leaving aside for a moment the question
of which is the better approach, it should be noted that when subsection (3) applies, it provides that the contract will consist of the
terms on which the writings of the parties agree and will be supplemented, where necessary, by terms provided by the Code.
Three cases, Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F. P. Bartlett & Co.,75 Universal
7
76
Oil Products Co. v. S.C.M. Corp. and Bickett v. W.R. Grace & Co.,7
seem to be examples of the first approach although the court opinions
do not expressly consider the problem in the context of subsection (3).
In each case the court found that a counter-proposal had been made
and, thus, no contract had been created under subsection (1). The
courts then determined that the counter-proposals had been accepted
by the offeror's actions 78 in accepting the goods and the contract was
formed on the the terms contained in the counter-proposal. Two other
cases, Bauer InternationalCorp. v. Eastern Township Produce, Ltd. 79
and Jones & McKnight Corp. v. Birdsboro Corp., 0 refer to

7s297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962).
76

313 F. Supp. 905 (D. Conn. 1970).

7712 UCC REP. SERV. 629 (W.D. Ky. 1972).
76In Universal Oil Products Co. v. S.C.M. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 905, 906 (D. Conn. 1970),
the court cited § 2-206 as the basis for finding acceptance of the counter-proposal.
794 UCC REP. SERV. 735 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967).
80320 F. Supp. 39 (N.D. Il. 1970).
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss2/2
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subsection (3) in situations involving exchanged documents containing similar terms. In both cases the court's opinion notes that the
exchange may have satisfied subsection (1), but then goes on to state
that a specific finding of the applicability of subsection (1) is not
necessary because the same result would be obtained under subsection (3). Neither case, however, addressed the counter-proposal followed by performance issue directly.81 Thus, there is some case law
supporting the first approach.
Little authority presently exists in favor of the second approach.
On the face of the subsection itself, no distinction is made between
writings which did not create a contract under subsection (1) because there was no definite acceptance, and those where there was a
conditional acceptance creating a counter-proposal. Subsection (3)
says only "although the writings of the parties do not otherwise
establish a contract."82
Two circuit court opinions, Dorton v. Collins83 and Construction
Aggregates Corp. v. Hewitt-Robins, Inc.,84 have discussed generally
the proper application of subsection (3). In both, however, the contract was found on the basis of actual agreement of the parties and
thus the court's comments are merely dicta. The court stated in
Dorton:
Conversely, when no contract is recognized under Subsection
2-207(1) - either because no definite expression of acceptance exists or, more specifically, because the offeree's acceptance is expressly conditioned on the offeror's assent to the
additional or different terms - the entire transaction aborts
at this point. If, however, the subsequent conduct of the
parties - particularly, performance by both parties under
what they apparently believe to be a contract - recognizes
the existence of a contract, under Subsection 2-207 (3) such
" Although § 2-207 (3) was not cited in Joseph Muller Corp. Zurich v. Commonwealth
Petrochem., 334 F. Supp. 1013 ( 1971 ), for this proposition, arguably it could be considered
an example of the first approach. In this case Muller was seeking to compel arbitration.
The court held that Commonwealth's response to Muller's contract form was a counterproposal which encompassed all of the correspondence between the parties, and that
Muller's shipment was acceptance of that counter-proposal. Yet the support this case
provides for the first approach is tenuous since the clause in question, arbitration, actually
appeared in Muller's contract and was not expressly included in Commonwealth's alleged
counter-proposal. Thus, this is not really an example of the last shot approach. Actually
it appears that the court is merely trying to develop an approach which will allow inclusion
of arbitration to which the court believed both parties had agreed.
82

This is repeated again in Comment 7.
In such cases, where the writings of the parties do not establish a contract, it is
not necessary to determine which act or document constituted the offer and which
the acceptance. The only question is what the terms are included in the contract,
and subsection (3) furnishes the governing rule.
CODE § 2-207, Comment 7 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
11453 F.2d 1161 (6th Cir. 1972).
F.2d 505 (7th Cit. 1968),
Published "404
by EngagedScholarship@CSU,
1975 cert. denied, 395 U.S. 921 (1969).
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conduct by both parties is sufficient to establish a contract,
notwithstanding the fact that no contract would have been
recognized on the basis of their writings alone. Subsection
2-207 (3) further provides how the terms of contracts recog5
nized thereunder shall be determined.
Similarly, language in the ConstructionAggregates opinion86 indicates
that in the case of an express counter-proposal, subsection (3) would
apply.8"
It appears that the courts have been reluctant to directly apply
subsection (3). Instead they have strained to find either outright
agreement concerning the disputed terms or the formation of a contract under subsection (1) thereby causing subsection (2) to come
into play to determine the appropriate term. In fact, of the 25 cases
discovered by the authors applying section 2-207 directly, not a
single case clearly applied subsection (3) as the sole basis for finding
a contract.
Upon substantial reflection, we believe that the second approach
of applying subsection (3) to every case where the writings did not
create a contract under subsection (1)88 is the sounder approach.
Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of the first approach
is that when the offeree has made his acceptance expressly conditional

$5453 F.2d 1161, 1166 (6th Cir. 1972) (emphasis added).
86404 F.2d 505, 509-10 (1968):
Section 2-207(3) recognizes that the subsequent conduct of the parties can
establish a contract for sale. Since CAC's July 3 purchase order and H-R's July
20 counter offer did not in themselves create a contract, Section 2-207 (3) would
operate to create one because the subseqent performance by both parties constituted "conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract".
Such a contract by operation of law would consist only of those terms on which
the writings of the parties agree together with any supplementary terms incorporated under other provisions of this act . ... " Here, however, there is
no occasion to create a contract by operation of law in default of further action
by the negotiating parties, for CAC can be said to have accepted the terms
of H-R's counter-offer.
87
Ithas been suggested by two commentators, W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1964) and Murray, supra note 3, that under some
circumstances involving a precise, clear counter-proposal, when the original offeror later
performs, he should be held to have accepted the terms of the counter proposal. Even
assuming that one can sensibly differentiate between a "dear" counter-proposal, where
last shot applies, and an "unclear" counter-proposal, where subsection (3) would apply,
the authors believe this approach does not square with the realities of the modern commercial transaction. Interpretation of § 2-207 should be based on an assumption that
the parties do not read the documents sent to each other. Therefore, even if the offeree
has made a clear counter-proposal, it is not necessarily valid to presume that the offeror
would be responding solely to that document and not the entire transaction. This is
particularly true where the offeree immediately performs as part of the response. In
such a factual setting, it is even more unlikely that the offeror will carefully read the
response.
88Of course, subsection (3) would not apply to the situation where there was only one
document and, in response to it, the other party performed. In such a case it is fair to
assume that the performing party is agreeing to the terms in the single document since
he has not indicated conflicting terms via his own document.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss2/2
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in a clear, conspicuous manner 89 the offeror is aware of the situation
and if he thereafter performs it can be assumed he is responding to
the terms in the counter-proposal and accepting them. The difficulty
with this argument is that it assumes that the offeror will recognize
that the response is a conditional acceptance rather than an indefinite
expression of acceptance. To base ultimate contractual rights on
this extremely nebulous distinction would introduce the grossest kind
of uncertainty into the commercial process. In addition, there is a
real question of whether the original offeror's performance should
be viewed as directed solely at the expressly conditional acceptance.
Presumably the original offeror can expressly accept the additional
terms in the conditional acceptance if that is his intention. By its
nature this situation will involve prior documents by both sides.
Thus, the performance after the expressly conditional acceptance
should be viewed as being in response to the entire exchange between
the parties and not just in response to the last writing.
To take the first approach is to allow the offeree to place himself in the more favorable position merely by having written the last
document. This would represent a return to the pre-Code policy of "last
shot" analysis. The better alternative is to construct a non-preferential
contract whenever formation results from the equivocal act of performance. One can argue that such an approach is more likely to
coincide with the parties actual expectations, thus serving the general
commercial interest.
On the other side, the risk from applying subsection (3) to all
cases where the writings do not create a contract under subsection
(1) seems small. At the very most, the offeree will have to accept
the provisions supplied by the Code. And if the authors' position as to
the applicability of course of dealing and usage of trade suggested
infra is adopted, 9 these very provisions are likely to be the ones
the parties would have expected to control.
If the offeree is so concerned about the inclusion of his terms, he
can always refuse to perform until he has the clear unequivocal
assent of the offeror to his terms. Subsection (3) will not apply until
the offeree also performs. Thus, if the offeree chooses to perform, he
should be exposed to the same risks of performance without agreement as is the offeror.
Two final issues should be noted in the operation of subsection
(3). First, what constitutes conduct sufficient to recognize the existence of a contract? Certainly it must, by the terms of subsection (3),
be by "both parties." Action by only one clearly does not show the

89

See text accompanying note 41-42 supra.
99 infra.

90See text accompanying notes 92 to
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intention of the non-acting party. One commentator
the joint action can be less than delivery, acceptance
At the very least, the conduct by each party should
make it clear to the other that both believe a contract
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suggested that
and payment. 1
be sufficient to
has been made.

The second issue involves the meaning of the language "together
with any supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions of the Act." 92 To the extent there has been consideration of
this issue, both the courts and the commentators have interpreted
this language literally. Thus, if the contract has been formed under
subsection (3) and a term exists in only one document, it is excluded
from the contract unless the Code provides that the term would have
been implied in a contract which is silent on the issue.93 We believe
that this is a much too restrictive view. In the same way that we
urged consideration of all of the surrounding circumstances, particularly usage of trade and course of dealing, to determine materiality
in subsection (2), we suggest that usage of trade and course of
dealing should help determine the terms incorporated by the Code
under subsection (3). If the parties had in the past arbitrated their
differences, or if it is standard in the industry to do so, should one
party be able to contend that arbitration should not be a term in
this transaction simply because the contract is formed by conduct
under subsection (3) and the Code does not by its terms impose
arbitration?
Although no court has, as yet, taken this approach,94 we believe
it is totally consistent with the language of subsection (3). Subsection (3) calls for addition of terms "incorporated under any
other provisions of this Act." In section 1-205, subsections (1)95 and
(2)96 define course of dealing and usage of trade. Subsection (3)
of section 1-205 then states:
" Lipman, supra note 3.

§ 2-207 (3).
This is the approach taken by the District Court, as reported in Dorton v. Collins &
Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161 (6th Cir. 1972), where the arbitration clause was in only
one document and the Code did not imply it. The Circuit Court quoted the District Court
as follows:
[T]he U.C.C. does not impose an arbitration term on the parties where their
contract is silent on the matter. Hence, a conflict between an arbitration and
an (sic) no-arbitration clause would result in the no-arbitration clause becoming
effective.
Id. at 1165.
9 But cf. Blue Rock Indus. v. Raymond Int'l, Inc., 325 A.2d 66 (Me. 1974); Oskey Gas.
& Oil Co. v. OKC Ref. Inc., 364 F. Supp. 1137 (D. Minn. 1973).
95
CODE § 1-205 (1):
A course of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct between the parties to a
particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common
basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct.
96
CODE § 1-205 (2):
A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing having such regularity
of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation that it
(Continued on next page)
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss2/2
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A course of dealing between
in the vocation or trade in
which they are or should be
to and supplement or qualify

parties and
which they
aware give
terms of an

any usage of trade
are engaged or of
particular meaning
agreement. 7

Similarly, section 2-208 involves the use of the two terms as integrated
interpretative tools.
If this approach is taken, the contract resulting from application
of subsection (3) is more likely to be a non-preferential one. If course
of dealing or usage of trade is ignored, the contract is likely to favor
the buyer. This results from the fact that the Code, while recognizing
that the parties could generally take any approach they wanted by
express agreement, implies terms favorable to the buyer when no
agreement exists. For example, while the Code recognizes that
warranties can be excluded or modified,98 if there is no such exclusion,
full waranties of mechantability and fitness for a particular purpose
will be implied. 99 Thus, an order for goods with no reference to
warranties followed by a response using clear counter-offer language
which includes disclaimer of warranty terms will result in no contract under subsection (1). If the parties then perform and subsection (3) is applied, the contract formed under subsection (3)
under the restrictive view presently taken by the courts will exclude
the offeree's disclaimer since there is no agreement between the
writings, and insert instead the implied warranty terms. While it
may be the proper approach to favor warranties in most cases when
the parties have not agreed on the issue, there are at least some
occasions when the normal practice in the industry is to exclude
warranties - particularly between merchants - because of the nature
of the goods sold. 100 In those circumstances the usage of trade should
supply the disclaimer term. An equally compelling argument could
be made in the case of an arbitration clause found in a counterproposal.
(Continued from preceding page)
will be observed with respect to the transaction in question. The existence and
scope of such usage are to be proved as facts. If it is established that such
a usage is embodied in a written trade code or similar writing, the interpretation of the writing is for the court.
97CODE § 1-205 (3)
(emphasis added).
9 CODE §2-316.
"CODE §§ 2-314, 2-315.
0OBickett v. W.R. Grace & Co., 12 UCC REP. SERV. 629 (W.D. Ky. 1972) is an example
of this problem. The offeror Bickett sent an order for seed to the offeree W.R. Grace &
Co. Grace responded by shipping the seed and attaching a tag which, consistent with the
practice in the industry, stated that all warranties were disclaimed and the buyer was to
returned the seed unopened if he did not agree to these terms. Bickett used the seed and
later sued on implied warranties. The court held that the tag constituted a counter-proposal
and then applied the last shot doctrine. Presumably, a problem troubling the court was
that if it applied subsection (3), it would have to exclude the disclaimer term. If the
approach we have suggested is followed the court could have included in the subsection
(3) contract the disclaimer clause because of the normal usage of trade.

1
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Proposed Model for Interpretation of Section 2-207
The extended discussion in the preceding section substantiates the
fact that the interpretation and application of section 2-207 has caused
the courts considerable difficulty. These difficulties have manifested
themselves in a number of ways. Some courts have interpreted the
same language of the section differently, 1 1 some have applied the
section without reference to issues considered necessary by other
courts in cases with similar fact settings, 10 2 and some have ignored
the section altogether.1 03 There have been many disappointing opinions
and unsatisfactory results, with the ultimate effect being a composite group of cases exceptionally difficult to compare. A major factor contributing to the extraordinarily erratic development of the
law of section 2-207 has been the plethora of possible issues, which
led to considerable variance in the the central issue being litigated in a
given case. Moreover, the courts have demonstrated an understandable
tendency to develop the pivotal issue involved in the case before them
at great length, leaving the reader to make assumptions and guesses
concerning the necessary but unarticulated underlying findings.
We believe that a standardized decisional format should help
bring increased direction to the formation of the law and greater
certainty to its interpretative application. The following model proposes steps that judges should follow in their initial analysis and the
findings they should summarize in their written opinions in every
section 2-207 decision. We have avoided a lengthy philosophical discourse concerning the concept of a decision-making/opinion-writing
model. The pros and cons of such a model are obvious; the brief discussion above should suffice to establish the relevancy of such an
approach in this context.10
Step 1 : Does the situationinvolve a response to an offer
or written confirmation?
The first determination must be whether the situation involves
an offer and response or a prior contract with a written confirmation. As indicated above105 the inclusion of the concept of written con-

101Compare, e.g., Construction Aggregates Corp. v. Hewitt-Robins, Inc., 404 F.2d 505 (7th
Cir. 1968), with Bickett v. W.R. Grace & Co., 12 UCC REP. SERv. 629 (W.D. Ky. 1972),
on the issue of what constitutes a counter-offer under § 2-207.
102 Compare, e.g., Silverstyle Dress Co. v. Aero-Knit Mills, Inc., 11 UCC REP. SERV. 292
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972), with Rite Fabrics, Inc. v. Stafford-Higgins Co., 366 F. Supp. 1
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
103See, e.g., Joseph Muller Corp. Zurich v. Commonwealth Petrochem., Inc., 334 F. Supp.
1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
104See Dunfee & Stern, Potential Competition Theory as an Antimerger Tool Under Section
7 of the Clayton Act, 69 Nw. L. REV -......... (1975) for a similar proposal concerning
the application of section 7 of the Clayton Act to potential competition conglomerate
mergers.
1os See text accompanying notes 44 to 50 supra.
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firmations in subsection (1) was to give the courts a procedure for
handling additional or different terms contained in a document sent
after a contract was formed. Therefore, if the issue in litigation is
whether terms found in a written confirmation are part of the contract, then the court need not consider further the contract formation
provisions of subsection (1) and should proceed to steps 4-7, infra. 16
If an offer and response situation is involved, it is necessary for
the court to determine which is the offer document and which is the
response. This may be difficult in some cases where there has been
an exchange of multiple documents, but such a step is necessary if
the court is to determine whether or not there has been an acceptance
and on which party's terms. Once this factual issue has been resolved,
the court should proceed to Step 2.
Step 2: Is the response a definite and seasonable expression
of acceptance?
In resolving this question the court should consider the factors
suggested in the preceding section of this article. In particular, language contained in the typed portion of the response should be compared with that of the offer. If the offer and response agree as to
the material items and indicate that the parties assent thereto,
that will strongly indicate that the response is an acceptance. Additional factors which should be considered, but should not in themselves be controlling, include the use of acceptance language and/or
a document commonly used in the trade as an acceptance.
If this question is answered affirmatively, a contract would be
created based on the offeror's terms as modified by Steps 4-7, infra,
unless the question in Step 3 is also answered affirmatively. If
this question is answered negatively, no binding contract exists and
during the executory phase of the transaction either party had the
opportunity to withdraw with impunity. If the parties have performed
subseqent to an exchange which failed to satisfy subsection (1),
subsection (3) might apply and the court should proceed to Step 8.
Step 3: Is the acceptance expressly made conditional on
assent to the variant terms which it contains?
The express counter-proposal must be just that - expressly stated,
clear and unambiguous. When letters and other non-form documents
are used, the usual principles for interpretation of contractual language should be applied to determine objectively the intent of the
writer. Printed provisions on documents ordinarily used to accept
offers, however, should not be found to constitute counter-offers. The
document should either be clearly identified as a counter-offer document and not look like an acceptance form, or it should contain non106

Many of the written confirmation situations will turn on the question of fact of whether or
part of the oral understanding of the parties.
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printed, conspicuous language expressly stating the conditional nature
of the acceptance. 10 7 If an express counter-offer is found, then the
counter-offeree may accept the counter-offer only by express statement
and not by performance standing alone. Such a requirement avoids
the arbitrary preference of the last shot approach. If there is no
express acceptance, there will not be a binding contract during the
executory phase of the the transaction. If the parties thereafter perform, subsection (3) might apply and the court should proceed to
Step 8. If the court finds that the acceptance is not conditional, it
should proceed with Step 4.
Step 4: Is the transactionbetween merchants?
This question must be determined under the definitional language
of section 2-104(1) and (3) of the Code.1" If the contract is not
between merchants, then the additional terms are merely proposals
and are excluded under subsection (2) unless expressly agreed to by
the original offeror. 10 9 If the contract is between merchants the variant
1
terms"
in the acceptance automatically become part of the contract
unless any one of the questions in Steps 5, 6 and 7 are answered affirmatively. Thus, once the contract is determined to be between merchants
the court must consider all three of the next steps.
Step 5: Has the offer expressly limited acceptance to its terms?
As with the determination of whether or not an express counteroffer has been made under Step 3, the court should only give effect to
clear, unambiguous non-printed language, either in the typed portion
of the offer document or in a covering letter. If the answer is in the
affirmative the court is finished and a contract exists solely on the
terms contained in the offer. If the answer is in the negative the court
should proceed to Step 6.
Step 6: Do the variant terms materially alter the contract?
The question should be treated as one of fact. Relevant factual
considerations include the economic value of the variant terms as
compared to the contract as a whole, consistency of the term with
107 For
108

an extended discussion of this point, see text accompanying notes 36 to 43 supra.

CODE

§ 2-104:

(1) "Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise
by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the
practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or
skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other
intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge
or skill.
(3) "Between merchants" means any transaction with respect to which both
parties are chargeable with the knowledge or skill of merchants.
1
09McAfee v. Brewer, 214 Va. 579, 203 S.E.2d 1209 (1974).
110We have used the phrase "variant terms" here so as not to raise again the issue of
additional versus different terms. For our views on this, see text accompanying notes
51 to 62 supra.
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any prior course of dealing between the parties, consistency with
industry trade practices, and the context of the negotiations themselves."1 In addition, the courts should avoid at all costs using per se
rules in resolving questions of materiality. The court should attempt
to make this determination as of the time of the formation of the
contract. The question should be: if the conflict between the terms
of the offer and the response had been raised at the time of negotiation rather than when an alleged breach had made them extremely
important, would the offeror have considered them non-material and
agreed to include them? Otherwise, the fact that the term is the subject
matter of litigation is likely to result in an almost automatic conclusion that the term is material resulting in its exclusion from the
contract.
If the answer to the question in Step 6 is affirmative the court is
again finished and the contract is based solely on terms of the offer.
If the answer is negative the court should proceed to Step 7.
Step 7: Has an objection to the variant terms been made
by the offeror?
To the extent that this refers to objection by the offeror after
receipt of the acceptance, it is a simple question of fact. The objection
must have been forthcoming within a reasonable time after notice
of the variant terms was received. The meaning of notification of
objection to a specific term prior to notice thereof being received is
more obscure. As in Steps 5 and 6, if the court answers the Step 7
question in the affirmative, the variant terms do not become part of the
contract. If the answer is in the negative, the variant term has met
the test of Step 5, 6 and 7 and is included as part of the contract. In
either case the court is finished and the terms of the contract are
determined.
Step 8: Has there been conduct by both parties which
recognizes the existence of a contract?
A court will reach this step only if the response either was not
a definite expression of acceptance under Step 2 or was expressly
made conditional in Step 3. When either of these situations occurs
the court must determine if both parties have shown by their conduct
that they believed there was a contract.112 If the court finds no such
conduct, that ends the inquiry and there is no contract. If such conduct
has occured the court proceeds to Step 9.

"' See text
112

accompanying notes 68 to 73 supra.
See text accompanying note 91 supra.
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Step 9: Which contract terms appear in the documents
of both parties?
In this step the court merely compares the terms of each party's
document(s) and strikes out any term that does not appear on both
sides. The concurrent terms become part of the contract.
Step 10: What contract terms are missing and what terms
would be implied by the Code?
If a contract term that will resolve the dispute between the parties
is missing after Step 9, the court must supply it by reference to the
Code provisions. In so doing the court should not merely supply terms
generally implied by the express provision of the Code, but should
also consider the prior course of dealings between the parties or the
usages of trade in the industry to help determine what terms should
be supplied. To the extent that the course of dealing or usage of trade
would supply a different term than the normal implied Code113term,
the course of dealing or usage of trade should take precedence.
Once the court has finished this step it has completed the model
and the applicable terms of the contract are determined.
A Suggested Statutory Revision
The preceding sections of this article discuss at length preferred
resolutions of the interpretive problems presented by section 2-207.114
The analysis culminated in a model for court decision-making, which,
if followed, should result in decisions evincing greater consistency and
fairness than existing case law. Particular emphasis has been placed
on the expanded use of subsection (3). In addition, it has been argued
that course of dealing and usage of trade should be used as important
factors in determining what terms will become part of the contract
formed under either subsection (1) or subsection (3).
However, there are problems with placing a continuing reliance
on the existing section. First, the present language is at best ambiguous and there is little assurance that the courts will rigorously
and consistently consider all the appropriate issues in section 2-207

113See text accompanying notes 93 to 99 supra.
114The central factual question will typically be the problem of which terms will be included

in a contract formed under § 2-207. Based on the cases decided to date, there have only
been three, Oskey Gas. & Oil Co. v. OKC Ref., Inc., 364 F. Supp. 1137 (D. Minn. 1973);
American Parts Co. v. American Arb. Ass'n, 8 Mich. App. 156, 154 N.W.2d 5 (1967);
Bauer Int'l Corp. v. Eastern Twp. Prod., Ltd., 4 UCC REP. SERV. 735 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1967), where a party was attempting to get out of a contract on the theory that there
had been no agreement on the terms. Of the three, only Bauer came up in the truly executory
stage of the transaction; the other two transactions broke down only after substantial performance. The vast majority of the cases involved the question of what terms were to be
included in a contract formed under subsection (1) or (3). The conclusion that must
be drawn from this is that the real problem is not in creating binding contracts - since
the parties almost always perform there is at least a contract under subsection (3) - but
rather what terms will be included or excluded from the contract.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss2/2

34

1975]

UCC 2-207

cases and then resolve those issues in a manner consistent with proper
commercial policy. Moreover, even if every court could be persuaded
to follow the model set out in the preceding section, the basic
structure of subsection (2) would continue to affect an arbitrary
preference for the offeror at least some of the time.
This likely preference in favor of the offeror results from the fact
that the section is couched in terms of offeror and offeree. The "variant
terms" are, by definition, those of the offeree and the basic purpose
of subsection (2) is to determine whether or not they are included in
the contract. As analysis in this article demonstrates, in most cases
the offeree's terms will not be included. 15 Certainly one reason behind
the change from the old mirror image rule to that of section 2-207 was
that the parties to a commercial transaction dealt in form documents
and thus, at least as to the printed terms, did not know, or very much
care at the time of negotiations, what was in them. Under such circumstances it made little sense to allow a party out of a contract when
there had been agreement as to the terms under active negotiation
merely because there were differences in the printed terms. Such
reasoning, however, also points up the fallacy in assuming that the
offeror knows or cares more about his printed terms than the offeree.
In fact, it is more likely that the parties are essentially interested in
making a deal and having assurances that the goods will be delivered
and accepted. Further it is reasonable to assume that as to the balance
of the terms contained in the printed portion, the parties (to the
extent they consider them at all) expect that the printed terms which
applied in prior dealings between them, or in like contracts between
like parties, would also prevail in this transaction. If these standards
did not resolve the issue, the parties would expect the courts to select
a fair and reasonable term.
The most direct and effective way to remove the ambiguities of
section 2-207 and simultaneously ensure the elimination of an arbitrary preference for either the offeror or offeree'16 is by proposing a
new statutory draft for consideration by the Commission on Uniform
State Laws and the respective state legislatures.
The decided cases under section 2-207 indicate that care should be taken to avoid the
the assumption that the seller will almost always be the offeree. In four of the cases the
opinion never made clear which party was the offeror. In those cases where a conclusion
has been reached on the issue (in several cases the court did not formally identify the
acceptor/offeree, but a reasonable conclusion could be drawn by inference) the seller and
the buyer were the offeror approximately an equal number of times. Certainly future
data may change this result, but on the information thus far, policies should not be
formulated, nor specific judicial decisions made, based on an assumption that the seller
will nearly always be the offeree (or offeror).
116Many commentators have criticized general preferences in favor of the offeror. See, e.g.,
Note, In Defense of the Battle of Forms, supra note 4. While it has received the name
"first shot" approach this is somewhat of a misnomer since it implies that first shot is
the opposite of the "last shot" approach under the common law. This is not really the
case. The last shot doctrine was applied when the writings did not form a contract while
first shot under § 2-207 refers to the preference for the offeror when the parties exchange does form a contract.
11s

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1975

35

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24 :171

Generally, the proposed revision would create a contract when
the parties agree concerning all of the material terms under active
negotiation, and neither party has expressly indicated that he wants
to be bound only if his terms apply. The contract thus formed would
protect the parties' expectation during the executory stage of the transaction in a manner similar to that of the present statutory scheme.
However, the proposed revision differs significantly from the present
statute in that the terms of the contract would be determined in all
cases in a non-preferential manner. The interpretive method would
be similar to the approach taken under subsection (3) of the present
section 2-207. That is, the terms would be those on which the parties
agree plus usage of trade as modified by prior course of dealing between the parties. If usage of trade and prior course of dealing would
not supply all of the necessary terms, then the Code would be used
to supply the balance. '
If the parties do not agree concerning all the material terms under
negotiation or if either party expressly indicates that he wishes to
be bound only on his terms, no contract is formed, and, as with the
present section, the parties forego contract protection during the
executory phase of the transaction. If the parties then perform, a
contract is created. Again, the contract would be based on nonpreferential terms, e.g., those on which the parties have agreed plus
usage of trade as modified by a prior course of dealing between the
parties. If any term necessary for determining the obligations of the
parties is still missing, it will be supplied by the Code.
The basic thrust of the revision is to create non-preferential contracts in every case where the courts, rather than the parties, are
supplying the necessary terms. The language of such a revised section
would read as follows:
Formation of Contracts Response

Variant Terms in Offer and

(1) Subject to any other requirement of this Act for
the formation of a contract, an exchange between parties
which agrees as to material terms actively under negotiation,
establishes a contract even though a writing of one party
states terms additional to or different from the terms of the
other party; unless either party states expressly in writing
that there is no intention to be bound except on the terms
contained in that party's writing. Such intention not to be
bound will be deemed to be expressly stated only when:

117If there is no course of dealing or usage of trade on which to rely, then the choice of
terms made by the drafters of the Code should be considered the fairest and most
reasonable approach under the circumstances.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss2/2
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(a) the following words are contained in conspicuous
language, in a writing sent to the other party: "(Insert name of party) intends to be bound only on all
of the terms, both typed and printed, contained in
this writing and no other document will establish
terms under this contract," and
(b) these words are not part of the printed portions of
the writing.
(2) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is sufficient to establish a contract even
though a contract has not been established under subsection
(1).
(3) The terms of a contract established under subsection
(1) or (2) will consist of those terms on which the parties
have agreed and, to the extent necessary to interpret the contract, terms supplied by the usage of trade as modified by any
course of dealing between the parties, together with any
supplementary terms incorporated under any other provision
of this Act. To the extent that the supplementary terms
incorporated under any other provision of this Act and the
usage of trade as modified by any course of dealing between
the parties cannot be construed consistently with each other,
the usage of trade as modified by any course of dealings between the parties will control.
Although on first impression this revision may seem radical, the
proposal retains that which is salutary in the present provision, and
corrects many of the problems discussed in prior portions of this
article. Initially, the revised statute is not couched in terms of whether
or not there has been an effective acceptance as is the case with the
present provision. Rather, the approach zeros in on the fundamental
issue - whether or not there is a contract when parties send documents to each other which do not mesh exactly. The proposed revision
eliminates use of the concepts of offer and acceptance and interposes
a transactional approach. Emphasis upon the characteristics of the
entire bargaining exchange is necessary to prevent summary preference of one party based solely on his characterization in the litigation
process as offeror or offeree. When results are dependent upon this
characterization, the parties (directed by counsel) are likely to engage in ritualistic steps in a battle to obtain the preferred legal status
position. Many of the famous examples of the battle of the forms
have been nothing more than this. The proposed approach seeks to
avoid decisions based on legal formalisms and to emphasize instead
the commercial nature of the transaction and the expectations that
flow therefrom.
Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1975
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The manner in which this change of emphasis is achieved can
best be understood in the context of the precise language of the
revision. The introductory phrase of subsection (1) : "Subject to any
other requirement of this Act for the formation of a contract," was
inserted to make clear that the revised section is not the sole basis
for determining the existence of a contract.118 For example, this language would forestall the argument that the provisions of section 1-103
relating to supplementary general principles of law no longer apply
to the determination as to whether or not a contract exists. Another
situation in which this language would apply occurs where a court
determines that one or both of the parties considered their exchange
merely preliminary negotiations even though they technically had
agreed on the material terms actively under negotiation.
Assuming all other requirements for contracts are met, subsection
(1) of the proposed revision provides for formation of a contract even
though the exchange between the parties includes additional or different terms, in much the same fashion as the present section. However,
the test of agreement is changed. The existing provision requires a
finding of a "definite acceptance" without giving any definitional
guidance as to what constitutes a definite acceptance. The language
of the new section affords a specific test which is consistent with the
concept found in Comment 2 of the present section, i.e., a contract
exists when the parties think they have a deal in the commercial sense
of that word. The pertinent language provides that the contract is
formed when the "exchange between the parties . . . agrees as to
material terms actively under negotiation." 1 ' Under this approach a
court must initially identify the material terms about which the parties
are seriously concerned at the time of negotiation and then determine whether the parties have.agreed to all such terms.12 0 Normally,
the negotiated material terms will be contained in the typed portion
of a form document, but they may also be found in an accompanying
letter or even be made orally. 121 The reference to "material" terms in
the section permits a court to find agreement on the terms under
active negotiation even though some minor term, such as shipping
instructions, was included in the typed portion of only one document.
In this setting, one useful test of a "material term" would be to

The first question that must be disposed of in litigation in this area would be whether
or not the revised § 2-207 would apply to the factual situation in litigation. The title of
the proposed revision indicates that there must be variant terms in the response in order
that the section apply - otherwise §§ 2-204 and/or 2-206 control.
119Accord, e.g., Lipman, supra note 3; Murray, supra note 3.
120 Code provisions which add missing terms, such as §§ 2-305, 2-306 and 2-308, would still
apply. Here the court is concerned solely with whether or not there is agreement concerning the material terms the parties have actually raised in active negotiation.
121
Any intention that there was no agreement on an oral term actively under negotiation will,
of course, be subject to the provisions of the parol evidence rule. CODE § 2-202.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss2/2
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determine if it had significant economic import in the context of the
bargain between the parties.
The language of the proposed revision indicates that a contract is
formed at the moment agreement on the terms under active negotiation
is reached. This relieves the court from the burden of determining
for contract creation purposes the meaning of subsequent documents.
Agreement could be established on the basis of an oral exchange or
an oral statement by one party and a document by the other as well
as by the exchange of two or more documents. This does not mean,
however, that once agreement has been found all future documents
would be ignored. Rather, the effect of any additional or different
terms contained in any additional documents would be considered
under subsection (3).
Subsection (1) does not provide what the terms of a contract
formed thereunder would be, except as to the material terms actively
under negotiation, which are obviously included. Determination of the
terms is made pursuant to subsection (3) of the revision.
The second half of subsection (1) of the proposed revision is
identical in intention to the "unless . . . expressly made conditional"
language in the present provision, i.e., the parties are given the
opportunity to insist on inclusion of their form terms before they
will be bound. It is unlikely that this portion of the revision would
see much use since its only effect is to forestall formation of a contract during the executory phase. If the parties later perform, their
position will be unaffected by any indication of their intention to be
bound only on their own terms. That is, on performance, the terms
of the contract will still be nonpreferential terms under subsection (3)
of the revision. Thus a party will condition his document only if he
intends to resolve any differences prior to performance. If he conditions his document as a matter of course in every transaction, intending merely to perform in any event, he loses the protection of a
binding contract during the executory phase of the transaction without gaining any advantage. Our intention is to give the party who
truly wants to negotiate the printed terms before he is bound the right
to do so. But that right exists only up to the point of performance.
Once the party performs, he becomes bound to a non-preferential contract as though he had not exercised this option. Thus the often
unproductive "battle of the forms" strategies will be rendered ineffective because a party cannot cause his terms always to prevail by
the mere use of certain "magic" words. Instead, a party can ensure
that his terms control only by obtaining the other party's express
agreement to them.
The balance of subsection (1) of the proposed revision establishes
the method by which a party must give notice of his intention to be
only on the terms
Publishedbound
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such intention to be effective. Subparts (a) and (b) require the use
of precise unqualified language which is conspicuous and cannot be
printed. The requirement of standardized, conspicuous language maximizes the likelihood that the party using the language actually intends
to make a conditional response, and that the party receiving such a
document would see the conditional language and, more importantly,
understand its legal implication. Since the use of such language by
one party precludes the formation of a contract prior to appropriate
performance by both parties, it is important that the receiving party
recognize the nature of this language so that he can move to protect
himself against the possibility of withdrawal from the transaction
by the other party. Additionally, the requirement that a party use
precise language makes a court's determination of whether or not
there has been a conditional response a simple issue of fact. Either
the exact language was used and in the proper fashion, or it was not.
This approach may seem somewhat inflexible since it requires a
party to act in such a precise way. It can be argued that this is the
very problem the drafters sought to avoid when they replaced the
mirror image rule with section 2-207. In this case, however, one must
balance the utility of the approach with the actual dangers. First, as
discussed above, it is likely to see little use. Second, if there is an
attempt to use it and the conditions of response are not met, the party
concerned about obtaining favorable terms, thinking he had successfully conditioned his response, would surely contact the other party.
It would do him no good to await performance. When such contact took
place, the parties would resolve their differences and each side would
be satisfied. In the event such contact did not occur, the parties would
be bound only to a non-preferential contract. In either event, some
inflexibility is surely a small price to pay for an approach that eliminates the costly and litigation-producing battle of the forms.
Subsection (2) of the proposed revision provides that when the
parties have either failed to agree on the material terms under active
negotiation or one or both parties have made conditional responses,
and they later perform, this performance will establish a contract.
This is much like the provision contained in subsection (3) of the
present section. As is the case under subsection (1), the terms of
the contract formed under subsection (2) will be determined under
subsection (3) of the proposed revision.
Subsection (3) of the proposed revision utilizes essentially the
same approach for determining the terms of a contract formed under
subsection (1) or (2) as the present section uses for contracts formed
only by performance. That is, the terms are those on which the parties
agree, supplemented by terms inserted by the court. However, the
proposal expressly augments the sources of such terms to include
course of dealing and usage of trade in addition to supplementary
terms provided in the Code.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss2/2
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One could argue that compelling the use of these additional sources
interjects further uncertainty. For example, how does one determine
the usage of trade when the parties' documents contain different terms,
or it is a one shot transaction, or the parties have different trade
practices because each is in a different "industry"? The authors
admit that these represent difficult factual questions for the courts.
However, these are the very problems with which courts contend
every day. As with any statutory language, these issues will have
to be resovled in specific adversary cases. The important fact still
remains that if courts can identify a course of dealing or usage of
trade relevant to a transaction then it should become part of the
agreement. In addition, if a court can not find a course of dealing
or usage of trade, the parties are no worse off than they are under
the present statute. The court merely falls back on the terms provided by the Code. If anything, this approach is more certain in
the sense that it is more likely to result in a contract with terms
closer to the expectations of both parties.
Under the proposed subsection (3), course of dealing, usage of
trade and supplemental Code terms will apply to an express agreement
carefully negotiated between the parties. Again, it might be argued
that the proposed revision thus adds unnecessary uncertainty to express agreements. Such a criticism is inappropriate. First, the parties
can easily exclude course of dealing and usage of trade by an express
clause to that effect if they so desire. Second, the Code already implies
a number of terms which can control express agreements unless explicitly excluded. Thus, the approach is hardly novel.
The proposed provision has a number of advantages. A court no
longer must determine whether or not a variant term is material or
nonmaterial. Express terms are only included if they are agreed to
by both parties. All other necessary terms must be implied by course
of dealing, usage of trade or Code provisions. The proper question,
provable on the basis of factual evidence, is whether or not the "extra"
term would normally be found in this type of transaction. If such a
term had normally been included in prior dealings between the parties
or would normally be included in this type of transaction, the term
would be included in the transaction under review. Thus, if arbitration or disclaimer of warranties are part of the parties' prior course
of dealing or are usually part of similar transactions they would be
included. If they are not part of a prior course of dealing or usage of
trade, the terms would be excluded regardless of whether or not they
would alter materially the terms contained in the other party's document. This seems to present a fairer result, particularly as to disclaimers of warranties or a case where a party seeks limitation on
liability. Under the existing subsection (3) provision, the Code would
insert the opposite result in every case.'
CODE §§ 2-316, 2-719. 1975
122See
Published
by EngagedScholarship@CSU,

41

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24 :171

It should be noted that under the proposed revision the terms
implied in the contract need not be mentioned in the documents of
either party. For example, neither party may mention warranties
but if the court discovers that the course of dealing or usage of trade
would normally require a warranty, one would be inserted in the
contract. This result is not really any different from what would
occur under the present subsection (3). If the contract is formed
under that subsection and the issue is warranties, the court would
include the warranties under the "supplementary terms incorporated
under" the Code language, even though the buyer never requested
them and, in fact, even though the seller had, in his documents, expressly disclaimed them. What the new approach would require is
that the court first determine if there is any course of dealing or
usage of trade between the parties as to warranties. If a determination
that there is no course of dealing or usage of trade is made then the
court again turns to the Code terms for guidance. If, however, a
course of dealing or usage of trade is found, that determination would
control even though it was a finding that no warranties should prevail."' This result is more in keeping with the parties' expectations
than is blind adherence to the buyer oriented provisions provided by
the Code even though the term is not mentioned in either document.
In actuality, if the documents are extensive, it is unlikely that a
court will find a course of dealing or usage of trade where neither
party has mentioned the term to be considered. To the extent such
a situation would occur, the negotiations would be essentially oral and
the documents sketchy. This will be particularly true with a term such
as arbitration which is not considered either way by the Code. If the
use of arbitration in a particular situation is so normal as to permit
a finding that it is either part of the parties' course of dealing or the
usage of trade in like transactions, one party at least, will generally
include arbitration in its form.
The revision also solves the problem of what to do with different,
as opposed to additional, terms when a contract is established based
on the parties' exchange. No distinction is made between different
and additional terms since all terms not in both parties' documents
will be tested for inclusion in the same way. That is, would they
normally occur in such a contract?

result is consistent with the approach taken in § 2-316 of the Code. While a disclaimer of warranty under § 2-316(2) would normally require (at least as to fitness)
a conspicuous writing, subsection (3) (c) provides:
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)

123This

(c)

an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by course of
or usage of trade.

dealing or course of performance
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In addition, no distinction is made between merchant and nonmerchant transactions. This was felt to be an unnecessary distinction
for three reasons. First, as indicated above, the section has been
invoked rarely in non-merchant situations. Non-merchants tend not
to use form documents and they read responses carefully. If the transaction is between a merchant on the one hand and a consumer on the
other, the provision will also have little impact since these tend to
be one document arrangements. Second, since the terms of the resulting contract will not have a preference, it is unlikely that either nonmerchant party will be unreasonably disadvantaged. Finally, although
the Comments are silent on the point (Comment 3 which describes
the basic operation of the section fails to make the distinction at all),
presumably one purpose for the distinction is to insure that only the
merchant offeror will end up being "stuck" by the addition of some
term of the offeree without further action. Under the proposed revision, the determination of terms is not influenced by a party's status
as buyer or seller and thus there is no longer a special case for protecting the non-merchant offeror.
Summary and Conclusion
The two decades of use of section 2-207 of the Code has resulted
in substantial academic criticism of the language accompanied by
concern over the commercial policy implications of certain interpretative approaches taken by courts in applying the section. In
response to this environment of criticism and concern, the authors
have undertaken a review of the statute with a view toward resolving
many of these problems.
This review has emphasized the commercial context in which
section 2-207 litigation is usually found. Essentially, the modern commercial transaction requires the use of form documents handled by lowlevel employees. These documents typically include standard printed
terms which often are ignored by the parties until a dispute arises.
Prior to the enactment of section 2-207, this meant that under the
"mirror image rule" the exchange of forms which usually contain
variant printed terms failed to form a contract. In addition, the further
result was that often the party sending the last document prior to
performance prevailed as to terms. Section 2-207 attempts to deal
with this situation by providing that a contract is formed upon receipt of a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance, regardless
of the presence of variant terms. The resolution of which variant
terms control is determined by reference to subsection (2) of the
section.
The basic criticism of section 2-207, as interpreted, is that it
still contains a preference for the terms of one party over another,
allowing that party's terms to dominate the transaction. In most
instances, the dominant party will be the original offeror whose terms
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control except as to non-material variations under the straightforward application of subsections (1) and (2) of section 2-207.
However, under the present interpretation of subsection (3), this
preference will belong to the buyer. The authors criticize these results
and advocate, first a liberalized interpretation of "material variance"
under subsection (2), and second, the consideration of usage of trade
and course of dealing in determining "supplementary terms" supplied
by the Code under subsection (3) in order to achieve a fairer, more
balanced approach to the determination of controlling terms.
In addition, other substantial, but less critical issues are considered.
The distinction made by some courts between additional and different
terms in applying subsection (2) is criticized and policy arguments
are advanced that no distinction be made. Court decisions interpreting
what constitutes an express counter-proposal and an express limitation
of acceptance to the terms of the offer are analyzed and the authors
propose the requirement that both limitations be expressly made, in
clear, conspicuous, non-ambiguous, non-printed language.
As a final step in reviewing the present section 2-207, the authors
propose a decision model for use by the courts in every case applying section 2-207 to aid in achieving these preferred resolutions. This
model is offered as a guide for the orderly formation of the law in this
area so as to achieve greater consistency and certainty.
The article concludes by proposing a revision of section 2-207
designed to emphasize the transactional nature of the parties' exchange rather than the status of the parties as offeror or offeree, buyer
or seller. The proposed revision is designed to create non-preferential
contracts and thus overcome the basic criticism of the present provision. A contract would be formed when the parties expressly agree
concerning all material terms under active negotiation; or, in lieu of
express agreement, when the parties appropriately perform. In both
cases the resulting contract would be comprised of the terms common
to the forms or statements of both sides, terms normally used in the
trade as modified by prior course of dealing by the parties and, where
necessary, supplemental Code terms. Enactment of the proposed revision would be the surest way of establishing a fair, predictable rule
determining non-preferential terms and at the same time discouraging
mindless battles of the forms.
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